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INTRODUCTION
Baby making has become big business. With delays in childbearing,
a concomitant rise in infertility, and ever-improving techniques to over-
come that infertility, the demand for assisted reproductive technologies
t @ 2009 by Sonia M. Suter. All rights reserved.
Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. BA., Michigan State
University (English); M.S., University of Michigan (Human Genetics); J.D., University
of Michigan. I am grateful to the participants of the roundtable, Baby Markets: Money,
Morals, and the Neopolitics of Choice, at DePaul University, especially Naomi Cahn,
Martha Ertman and Michele Goodwin. In addition, my gratitude goes to Bob Tuttle,
Julie Steiff, and Ronald Suter, who always offer invaluable comments and insights.
Many thanks to Kasia Solon, my library liaison, and to Gabrielle Kohlmeier and Jacque-
line Ingber, my research assistants, who were all incredibly efficient, thorough, and
resourceful. Finally, I want to thank Dean Fred Lawrence for his helpful comments, as
well the George Washington University Law School for research and faculty support.
Contact Information:
George Washington University Law School





218 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW [Vol. 16:217
(ART) is increasing. ART, once viewed with suspicion and skepticism,
has become a $3 billion industry.' In vitro fertilization (IVF), one form
of ART, "is now a popular, revenue-generating procedure, with individ-
ual clinics grossing as much as $20 million annually. 2 Indeed, in the
United States alone, such forms of ART have created at least a $1.7 bil-
lion market.! But IVF clinics are not alone in profiting from the
demand for ART. Women are selling eggs at ever-increasing prices, rang-
ing from a few thousand dollars to as much as $50,000-100,000.4 One
need not look far for ads soliciting the purchase of ova from college stu-
dents fitting a particular profile.' Sperm donation (or, more correctly,
sperm sale) has been ongoing for some time, though at considerably
lower prices.
ART has transformed from a new technology used by only a few to
a burgeoning market so strong that niche markets have emerged to ful-
7fill the particular needs and desires of certain consumers. Some sperm
1. See NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS
LEGAL REGULATION 1 (2009) [hereinafter CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES].
2. Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The Illusory
Choice ofMotherhood, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 22 (2005) ("[O]ver the past ten
years ... the number of children born through ART techniques quadrupled.").
3. Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business, 10 MINN. J. L.
Sci. & TECH. 41, 47 (2009).
4. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 148; June Carbone & Paige Got-
theim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation and Trust: Building Ethical Understandings into
the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 515 (2006); Couple
Seeks Eggs for $100,000, VERO BEACH PRESs J. (Fla.), Feb. 9, 2000, at A16. Most
payments to egg donors are no more than $5000, Peggy Orenstein, Your Gamete,
Myself N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jul. 15, 2007, at 40, but some have been paid as much as
$15,000, id, or even $100,000, DEBRA SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 46 (2006).
5. An advertisement in a number of Ivy League colleges read, "'Egg Donor Needed,'
adding, 'Large Financial Incentive.' The advertisements called for a 5-foot-10, ath-
letic woman who had scored at least 1400 on her Scholastic Achievement Test and
who had no major family medical problems. In return for providing eggs, she would
receive $50,000." Gina Kolata, $50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg Donor, N.Y
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/03/us/
50000-offered-to-tall-smart-egg-donor.html.
6. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 148 ("The price of a sperm vial
ranges, but it may cost hundreds of dollars.").
7. The gamete market has created "potential consumer preferences for certain (border-
ing on the eugenic) characteristics of their gamete providers, characteristics that go
beyond basic gamete safety and the desire to become a parent but turn on the nature
of identity." Id. at 150; see, e.g., Pacific Reproductive Services, https://www.pacrepro.
com/index.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) (a sperm bank that is run by and targeted
toward the lesbian population); see also Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception:
Fertility Tourists, Globalization, and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295,
326-27 (2005) (describing fertility tourism marketing itself as a romantic holiday for
couples seeking to get pregnant).
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banks offer "specialty" sperm from donors with particular qualities, such
as high IQ." Others cater to the lesbian and gay community. Egg bro-
kers seek out ova sellers who have the physical and intellectual qualities
that match their customers' preferences.'o Women sell gestational surro-
gacy services, carrying an embryo created by the gametes of others or
using their own eggs for insemination." One can even now purchase a
made-to-order embryo.12
The commodification of reproductive materials and services has
created veritable baby markets" nationally and internationally. To a large
extent these baby markets, particularly with respect to gametes, are free
and unfettered. The infertility industry fits well within America's capital-
istic norms, evolving to meet consumer desires and needs-almost
always for a buck.
The commodification of reproductive material evokes different re-
sponses. Some argue that the sale of reproductive material should be
prohibited." Others argue in favor of unfettered baby markets on princi-
ple or to achieve broad-scale access to reproductive technologies." In this
Article, I respond to the emergence of baby markets with great skepticism,
8. For instance, the California based sperm bank, Cryobank, allows prospective recipi-
ents to search for their perfect sperm match according to fields such as occupation,
education level, and areas of study of the donor. California Cryobank, Inc. Advanced
Search, http://www.cryobank.com/Donor-SearchlAdvanced-Search/ (last visited Feb.
2, 2009).
9. For instance, Pacific Reproductive Services markets itself as "a sperm bank that is
fully supportive and understanding of [a woman's] unique needs [making] the in-
semination process easier." Pacific Reproductive Services About Us, https://
www.pacrepro.com/index.php?main-page=about-us (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
10. Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian
Ethos, 33 Aa. J.L. & MED. 567, 621 (2007) ("For-profit egg and sperm banks rou-
tinely cater to consumer preferences donor characteristics such as educational,
professional, and athletic achievements.").
11. See SPAR, supra note 4, at 69-96 (describing the evolution of the surrogacy market).
12. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 149 (describing the growing market for
embryos in which recipients may chose from "donor profiles" that the embryo bank
had already "manufactured."). Recently, a British couple paid £9,000 to purchase a
made-to-order embryo based on particular traits and qualities. Daniel Martin, Couple
Pay.E9,000 to Have the First British Web Baby, DAILY MAIL (London), Jan. 18, 2007,
at 7.
13. In most of this Article, I primarily refer to the buying and selling of gametes and
embyros, although I make some references to surrogacy services as well.
14. Some countries have prohibited the sale of gametes. See Carbone & Gottheim, supra
note 4, at 538 (noting that Australia and Sweden prohibit the sale of gametes); John
McMillian & Tony Hope, Gametes, Money, and Egg Sharing, 362 LANCET 584, 584
(2003) (noting that "countries such as Israel, Australia, Denmark, France, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and Denmark" prohibit payment to gamete donors).
15. Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved
Theory ofCommodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 16 (2003).
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but reluctant acceptance. Drawing on a relational conception of auton-
omy and self-definition, I argue that commodification of reproductive
material is intrinsically harmful. Moreover, such commodification poses a
number of consequential harms. Nevertheless, in spite of these concerns, I
"give in" to baby markets, which is to say I do not argue for the prohibi-
tion of these markets, but instead for their regulation and oversight. I give
in to baby markets in part because of the great impracticality of prohibit-
ing markets given how well entrenched they are; people have been buying
and selling reproductive material for some time. In addition, as I shall
suggest, although there are risks of markets, the risk-benefit calculus calls
for allowing markets to exist, provided there is careful and serious regula-
tion of such markets. In other words, I am not willing to accept
completely free and unfettered markets.
In Part I, I use a relational theory of personhood to suggest that re-
productive material can be relationally self-defining, depending on our
intentions and actions. The more self-defining such material is, the
more intrinsically harmful it is to buy and sell it. I emphasize, however,
that baby markets do not exist in a world where all things are equal.
Therefore, we must also consider the effects (both positive and negative)
of these markets in an imperfect world. In Part II, before describing the
consequential effects of baby markets in detail, I explain why I give in to
baby markets. In short, I take a pragmatic approach that suggests we
should (reluctantly) accept baby markets as long as we offer measures to
counteract the negative effects of commodification. To be sure, intrinsic
harms cannot be completely avoided. But given the impracticalities of
prohibiting markets, our focus should be on making baby markets work
equitably, safely, and in a way that protects the interests of all involved:
seller, buyer, and future child. In a country with limited regulation of
the reproductive industry, this may be a tall order.
Part III addresses the first and, in some ways, most pressing conse-
quential effects of baby markets: the coercion, distorted decision
making, and power imbalances that arise when money drives the ex-
change of reproductive materials and services, particularly in an
unregulated industry. This Part offers proposals for reforming informed
consent to enhance decision making and for regulating the industry to
try to eliminate some of the conflicts of interest and power imbalances
that can distort decision making and threaten the safety of buyers, sell-
ers, and future children.
Part IV returns in more detail to the problem of relational auton-
omy, but this time from the perspective of the children born of ART
who have no ability to express market preferences since they are not
buyers or sellers in these markets. I argue that market preferences have
220 [Vol. 16:217
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favored provisions ensuring the anonymity of sellers of reproductive ma-
terial, which threaten the child's relational autonomy in learning about
her biological heritage. Recognizing that these interests may conflict
with the interests of sellers and buyers, I offer reasons for resolving this
conflict in favor of the child.
In Part V, I respond to the arguments that unfettered baby markets
increase access to ART. While they may increase supply and theoretically
prevent discriminatory practices, I argue that the barriers of cost, minor-
ity status, and marital status cannot be overcome simply by the presence
of unrestricted markets. Instead, public mechanisms may be necessary to
bridge some of the gaps in access. In short, once again, I argue for the
acceptance of baby markets, but not without prophylactic regulations.
Finally, in Part VI, I address the way in which market preferences
raise eugenic concerns. My discussion is brief here, building on argu-
ments I have made previously about how we should evaluate criticisms
that certain reproductive choices are eugenic.16 In essence, I argue that
the market can exacerbate underlying prejudices and heighten social in-
equity. As a result, I suggest we set price limits on reproductive material
to minimize these market effects.
Ultimately, I am most troubled by the consequential harms of baby
markets, some of which can be remedied through regulation, some of
which can only be tempered. I am also concerned about the potential
for intrinsic harms, which as I shall suggest in the next section cannot be
overcome through regulation. As we shall see, however, the degree of
intrinsic harm varies depending on one's relationship with and expecta-
tions for one's reproductive material. I turn now to the problem of
intrinsic harms.
I. COMMODIFICATION AND PERSONHOOD INTERESTS
The concern that baby markets are intrinsically harmful builds on
the theory that market valuation is inherently corruptive if we treat cer-
tain goods as reducible to monetary measures of value." Whether
commodification poses intrinsic harms or degrading effects depends on
the "character of the particular good in question" and "the ideals at
16. Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World ofDesigner Babies?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897
(2007) [hereinafter Suter, Brave New World].
17. Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits ofMarkets, Lecture at
Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11-12, 1998), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HuMAN VALUES 89, 94-95 (1998), available at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/
lectures/documents/sandelO0.pdf.
2009] 221
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
stake."" We potentially do harm to ourselves and to human flourishing
if we treat something integral to ourselves as a commodity, i.e., as sepa-
rate and fungible." Whether and to what degree commodification is
problematic therefore depends on whether and to what degree the puta-
tive "commodity" is integral to the self.
I contend that because embryos and gametes are severable and
separable from us, they are not per se integral to us. But the possibility
of severability and separation is not sufficient to assess whether some-
thing is essential to human flourishing. Some things that are severable
and separable, such as employment, can sometimes be deeply integral to
the self.20 To assess how integral something is to the self, we must con-
sider other factors such as our intentions and actions regarding the
commodified item, that is, whether we want to separate from it or
whether we see it as integral to us. 2' Equally important is the nature of
our relationship to the commodified item, not just as defined by us, but
as understood culturally, legally, and biologically. 22
What makes embryos, and to a lesser extent gametes, integral to
personhood interests is their centrality to decisions about reproduction
and the creation of families. 23 They occupy a unique place in the world
of "things" because of their reproductive potential. 24 As one court and
many ethicists have recognized, embryos are neither property nor per-
sons, but tissues that deserve special respect because they implicate
people's procreative interests.25 Gametes do not, in and of themselves,
have the same capacity, but they are of course essential to the reproduc-
tive process in a way that ordinary cells are not.
18. Id. at 104.
19. Margaret Radin has been influential in this discussion and I draw to a large extent on
her analysis in such works as MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES
(1996), and Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849
(1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability].
20. Similarly, personal information, which is not severable, can be quite integral to us.
21. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 19, at 1880-81.
22. Cf id. (Although Radin does not discuss this point specifically, she discusses the way
in which our relationship to the commodified item is in part understood culturally. I
believe that our cultural attitudes toward these relationships are influenced by bio-
logical connections and what they mean culturally; and that our legal conceptions are
influenced by our cultural views of certain relationships).
23. Cf Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REv. 359, 458
(2000).
24. See id. ("Although embryos themselves are not full-fledged persons, they differ from
other body parts because of their potential to develop into a person.").
25. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592-97 (Tenn. 1992) (describing this view among
commentators).
[Vol. 16:217222
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The nature of our relationship with gametes and embryos and their
role in self-definition depend a great deal on context and our intentions
regarding them, specifically the procreative decisions we make and the
relationships that we choose or do not choose to form with the people
they may become. But their role in self-definition also depends on the
biological, social, and cultural importance of our intergenerational rela-
tionships to them. This assessment is rooted in a notion of selfhood that
is relational, where self-discovery unfolds "in relation to others with
whom we confront our thoughts against their thoughts," where "my life
is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I de-
rive my identity," as opposed to an "atomistic conception of self-
definition, in which the individual shapes herself without reference to
others."26 This relational understanding of the self looks to a broad range
of communities of which one is a part. As philosopher Alasdair MacIn-
tyre has noted,
What I am ... is in key part what I inherit, a specific past that
is present to some degree in my present. . . . I inherit from the
past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of
debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations....
This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity."27
Under this relational notion of self-definition, the extent to which
embryos and gametes are self-defining depends on whether they will
become people who form part of the community from which we derive
our identity. Embryos and gametes may be the origins of families and
intimate relationships. Even when genetic relatedness is absent-as in
the case of a couple or individual who obtains an embryo for
implantation-the embryo, which will become their child, defines them
in very real and deep ways, and thus is integral to the self. Alternatively,
embryos or gametes may be something from which we intentionally
separate (whether or not for money) with little or no possibility of
future connection: We might donate them to unknown infertile couples
or researchers, or we might request that extra reproductive material be
destroyed. 28 The fact that we treat these embryos as separable from us
diminishes the extent to which they are integral to us. How much
26. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding
of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 772, 773 n.174 (2004) [hereinafter
Suter, Disentangling] (quoting ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
MORAL THEORY 221 (1981)).
27. MACINTYRE, supra note 26, at 205.
28. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN EMBRY-
ONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 81 (2005) [hereinafter NAS GUIDELINES].
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depends on why we choose to separate from them. If just profit
motivates this separation, we are treating them "as essentially fungible
and interchangeable," 29 and our personhood interests are lessened. But if
altruism prompts us to separate from embryos (whether or not we are
paid) to help infertile coupleso or promote research," then these
decisions are more relationally self-defining because such decisions are
based on our membership in and commitment to the community writ
large. In cases where we donate gametes or embryos to friends or family
as part of our commitment to these relationships, an even more
significant relational interest would exist.3 2 In all of these cases, however,
separability is the main intention, and therefore these actions are not as
self-defining as decisions to use embryos or gametes to become a parent
to the future child.
A recent case involving "a colossal mix-up" of sperm at a fertility
clinic demonstrates how intent and actions regarding gametes can impli-
cate strong personhood interests." In this case, the clinic accidentally
used a man's sperm to inseminate, not his girlfriend as intended, but a
woman who had arranged for artificial insemination by an anonymous
29. Rao, supra note 23, at 458-59 ("As a result . . . relationships with the embryos merit
only the same legal protection afforded to other object relationships.").
30. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reproductive Med., Financial Incentives in Re-
cruitment of Oocyte Donors, 74 FERTILITY & STERILITY 216, 218 (2000) [hereinafter
Ethics Committee] (surveying ova donors and finding that for most donors a signifi-
cant factor in selling eggs was to help infertile people); Lori B. Andrews, Beyond
Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REv.
2343, 2353 (1995) (describing the altruistic motives of surrogate mothers).
31. NAS GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at 81.
32. In these cases, financial exchanges are also less likely.
33. See Rao, supra note 23, at 364. The line of cases that protect decisional privacy in
reproduction, marriage, and child rearing are consistent with the view that decisions
regarding whether and how to create certain relationships enhance and foster self-
definition. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 923 (1992) ("These mat-
ters [involve] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime...."). One might respond that this very line of cases undercuts my claim
that our degree of personhood interests in embryos or gametes varies to some degree
based on our intentions and actions regarding them. One might say, for example,
that if reproductive decisions, including decisions not to procreate, implicate privacy
and personhood interests, then shouldn't all decisions regarding embryos and gametes
equally implicate the kinds of personhood interests that commodification threatens?
The difference is that the reproductive privacy cases address decisions about whether
to procreate or not, but they do not address our relationship to gametes and embryos
and their role in self-definition. Deciding to sell one's gametes or embryos is a pro-
creational decision in one sense, but it is a decision that reduces our self-defining,
relational interests in those entities. In contrast, deciding to procreate to create a fam-
ily maximizes our self-defining, relational interests in them.
34. Angela Valdez, The Wrong Egg, SALON.COM, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.salon.com/
mwt/feature/2006/l 1/16/fertility-mix-up/index.html.
224 [Vol. 16:217
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donor." The man's goal was to use his gametes to create his own family,
not to help an unknown woman conceive.36 His is not a case where the
sperm donor considers his sperm severable and separable. In fact
"[w]hen asked about the common assumption that men regard their
sperm as expendable, he begins to cry."3 7 In short, he had strong person-
hood and relational interests in his gametes. As a result, he went to court
to ask to be declared the legal father if a child was born and turned out
to be his."
Since the choices we make with respect to gametes and embryos
influence the degree of personhood and relational interests," the extent
to which baby markets threaten human flourishing turns, in part, on
intent and actions. Thus when someone chooses to sell gametes or
embryos, the intrinsic harms of commodification are far less (although
as Parts III-VI suggest, consequential harms are still present). When
someone intends to use them to create a family, commodification is
particularly threatening to human flourishing. The famous case In re
Baby IWO raises these kinds of concerns. In that case, an infertile couple,
William and Elizabeth Stern, entered into a contract with Mary Beth
Whitehead, a gestational surrogate who agreed to conceive a child
through artificial insemination with the husband's sperm, to carry the
child to term, and to relinquish her parental rights so the couple could
adopt the child." In exchange she was to be paid.42 Originally Mrs.
Whitehead's personhood interests in the fetus were minimal: she
35. Id. For purposes of ease and space, I, like many others, refer to sellers of eggs and
gametes as donors, a misnomer to be sure. Technically, when they receive money for
this reproductive material they are sellers. See Bonnie Steinbock, Payment for Egg Do-
nation and Surrogacy, 71 MOUNT SINm J. OF MED. 255, 255-56 (2004) (noting that
the term, "donation," is the accepted usage, even though it refers to a "commercial
enterprise").
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1040 (Kan. 2007) (discussing a sperm
donor's unsuccessful petition to be treated as the legal father of twins conceived
through the artificial insemination of his friend, in part, on grounds that it violated
his due process rights "to care, custody, and control of his children").
38. Valdez, supra note 34. While sperm donors typically sign away their rights to cus-
tody, he had not intended to be an anonymous sperm donor. Instead, he planned to
use his sperm to create his own child, and therefore never signed away parental rights.
39. Cf Rao, supra note 23, at 458 ("In the absence of a relationship between the person
and the embryo, . . . the embryo may be addressed as an object of ownership gov-
erned by the law of property. For example, individuals who seek to sell their spare
embryos ... treat the embryos as essentially fungible and interchangeable, much like
other objects of ownership.").
40. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (N.J. 1988).
41. BabyM, 537 A.2d at 1235.
42. BabyM, 537 A.2d at 1235.
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intended and contracted to separate from the future child." But in the
course of the pregnancy, she formed the kind of relational attachment
that implicates personhood interests and that led her to change her
mind." Of course the Sterns, who desperately wanted a family," also
had strong, relationally self-defining interests in the future child. They
had entered into the contract and agreed to pay money with the specific
16goal of bringing a child into the world whom they intended to raise.
Among the concerns that led the Baby M court to invalidate the
contract was the exchange of money." The court reasoned that com-
modification was harmful to all involved: the future child, the
gestational surrogate, the natural father, and the adoptive mother.48 It
concluded that "[t]here are, in a civilized society some things that
money cannot buy."" In so doing, the court drew upon the kind of dis-
comfort many feel regarding certain financial exchanges, such as paying
a spouse for sex, paying for a baby, or paying for a mail-order bride.o
43. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
44. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1236-37. Indeed, a psychologist from the Infertility Center,
who evaluated Mrs. Whitehead found that she "demonstrated certain traits that
might make surrender of the child difficult and that there should be further inquiry
into this issue in connection with her surrogacy." Id. at 1247-48. Apparently, these
findings were not shared with the Sterns or Mrs. Whitehead. Id. at 1248.
45. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235-36.
46. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235-36. One might question whether the purchasers of the
embryo have a self-defining relationship with the embryo before the transaction is ac-
tually completed. A couple or individual who purchased an embryo or gamete to
create a family, however, would rightly argue that the act of purchasing the gamete or
embryo to create a family is itself self-defining because it is the first-step in a process
intended to bring about a child.
47. The irrevocability of the gestational surrogate's agreement to terminate her parental
rights prior to conception was equally problematic to the court. Baby M, 537 A.2d at
1250. The court found that the irrevocability prevented Mrs. Whitehead from mak-
ing an informed, voluntary decision.
Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably committed before she
knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never makes a totally
voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the
baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed, and any decision
after that, compelled by a pre-existing contractual commitment, the threat
of a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $ 10,000 payment, is less than totally
voluntary.
Id. at 1248.
48. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1250.
49. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249.
50. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1241-42 (discussing the "evils inherent in baby-bartering"); see
also Donna R. Lee, Mail Fantasy: Global Sexual Exploitation in the Mail-Order Bride
Industry and Proposed Legal Solutions, 5 AsLA L.J. 139, 140 (equating the mail order
bride business to prostitution and involuntary servitude); William B. Turner, Putting
the Contract into Contractions: Reproductive Rights and the Founding of the Republic,
226 [Vol. 16:217
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Baby M was, we hope, the rare case where the ultimate intention of
one of the contracting parties changes." Assuming sellers do not change
their minds, their actions and intentions with respect to the embryos,
gametes, or future child is usually severability and separation. As a re-
sult, in most instances, although the sellers of the embryo, gamete, or
surrogacy service5 2 will have a relational interest in the gametes or em-
bryos, their interest will be less than that of buyers who intend to
establish a life-long relationship as parents of the future child.
Although choice and intention are highly important in establishing
the degree to which embryos and gametes are integral to the person, this
evaluation should not be purely subjective. Self-definition based on rela-
tionships is shaped not only by our choices regarding which
relationships to embrace, but also by objective factors. We are defined,
in part, by relationships that have social, cultural, and intergenerational
importance, even if we do not have the subjective experience of being
related." For example, a woman may give birth to a child and ultimately
choose not to have a relationship with that child. But until the child has
been legally adopted, we recognize that child as the woman's, even if her
intention is to part with it." Even afterwards, we think of the child as
2005 Wis. L. REv. 1535, 1560-61 (2005) (stating that agreements between hus-
bands and wives with sex as consideration are not valid contracts). Cf infra note 65.
As one commentator queries, given that there are no laws prohibiting the payment
for gametes and embryos, why do we insist on the euphemism of "donation" unless
"to mask the pervasiveness of the literal market transactions that occur surrounding
something we connect to a deep sense of personhood[?]" Suzanne Holland, Contested
Commodities at Both Ends of Life: Buying and Selling Gametes, Embryos, and Body Tis-
sues, 11 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 263, 272 (2001). Perhaps this need to mask the
commodification reveals our great discomfort with this reality. Id. at 274.
51. Cf Andrews, supra note 30, at 2351 ("Apparently fewer than one percent of surro-
gates ... change their mind and make an effort to keep the child, which is in keeping
with data about the women who change their mind about sterilization or abortion.").
52. Surrogacy is tougher because of the fact that the fetus is not severable from the indi-
vidual in the way that an embryo is. Thus, while the surrogate may ultimately decide
to separate from the child at birth, a relationship is potentially unfolding within her
body, making any change of heart all the more compelling from a personhood con-
text. However, Lori Andrews discovered from interviews with surrogates that they
"did not refer to the fetus as 'my baby,' . . . but as the intended parents' baby." An-
drews, supra note 30, at 2352. Nevertheless, one study found that twenty-two percent
of surrogates considered separating from the baby to be the most emotionally trou-
bling part of the arrangement, while twenty-five percent considered it to be
separating from the intended parents. Id. at 2353. This suggests that the relational in-
terests for surrogates exist, but are less than those for the intended parents.
53. See supra text accompanying note 27.
54. For instance, the biological mother's rights do not terminate until she has given her
consent to adoption. See, e.g., A.A. CODE § 26-10A-7(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 8605 (2008). In some states, the biological mother's parental rights are
2009]1 227
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER &t LAW
hers biologically." We would not misspeak, in one sense, if we described
the adopted child as her child. Biological parents themselves may still
feel like parents in one sense, even if they intend to relinquish parental
rights.
Unless the biological relationships are complex (e.g., when intended
parents use in vitro fertilization, donor gametes, and/or a gestational sur-
rogate to bring a child into the world) , we have long established cultural
and legal understandings that a parent-child relationship exists given cer-
tain biological connections." Of course, these understandings are not set
in stone, and our society and laws recognize the importance of allowing
people to redefine these relationships through adoption." The fact,
however, that this redefinition requires legal recognition and does not
occur solely because of one's intentions and experiences attests to the
fact that a relationship of sorts exists given certain biological connec-
tions between two individuals. The relationship may ultimately change
legally, socially, and emotionally from the presumed parent-child rela-
tionship, but it nonetheless remains a self-defining relationship given the
cultural respect and recognition of this biological connection.
Lest I be misunderstood, let me be clear that I am not suggesting
that the biological connection is greater or more significant than the
relationship between the adopted child and adoptive parents or between
the child born through gamete donation and the intended parents.
Clearly the adoptive parents or the parents who used donor gametes to
so strong that she may revoke her consent to an adoption within a given time period.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.160(2) (LexisNexis 2008) (allowing the
revocation of consent to adoption any time before the consent is approved by the
court); N.Y. Dom. REL. § 115-b(3) (McKinney 2008) (allowing the revocation of
consent within forty-five days of the execution of the consent so long as the consent is
not executed or acknowledged before a judge or surrogate).
55. Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for
Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 176 (1999).
56. Id. ("For the biological parents, their identity as 'parents' remains, regardless of when
they relinquished their child. Quite commonly, biological parents still feel that they
are parents . . . "); id. at 177 ("[M]any birth mothers still feel a closeness to the chil-
dren that they relinquished for adoption.").
57. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1412 (1998) (addressing
the question of who the legal parents are when a couple (the intended parents) ar-
ranged to have "an embryo genetically unrelated to either of them implanted in a
woman-a surrogate-who would carry and give birth to the child for them").
58. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Rela-
tionship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1011, 1015
(2003) ("[Cjourts most often assume that the word 'parent' refers [sic] a child's bio-
logical progenitors.").
59. Id. at 1024 (discussing societal exceptions to the general rule that a child's parent is
dependent on a biological connection).
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bring a child into existence form a more significant and self-defining
relationship than the individual who is merely genetically related to the
child.co My point is that the fact of being genetically related to another,
whether by giving birth to a child or by being an egg or sperm donor, is
nevertheless self-defining. Thus, those who are genetically related to
embryos and gametes (i.e., the gamete donors) as well as the intended
parents are defined by the relationships that exist between them and the
people who will develop from those embryos or gametes. For the in-
tended parents who embrace these relationships, which are often legally
and socially recognized, the gametes or embryos are especially self-
defining.6' For the gamete or embryo donors, the relationship can be
purely genetic (assuming there is no plan for contact with the resulting
child). 62 As a result, the embryos or gametes are integral to the self, but
less so than in the former instance.
Because embryos and gametes are integral to the self, albeit to dif-
fering degrees depending on intention, actions, and objective
recognition of certain relationships, commodification of this reproduc-
tive material is intrinsically harmful. As others have noted, we threaten
human flourishing when we treat something integral to us as a com-
modity.6 ' This claim, however, presumes a world in which the only
variable at issue is whether or not money should change hands in ex-
change for an embryo, gamete, or surrogacy service. It presumes no
other threats to human flourishing such as unequal bargaining power,
unequal access to reproductive options, or limited availability of gametes
and embryos. In this theoretical world, widely divergent from the real
world, it seems particularly unsettling and improper to engage in finan-
cial transactions with respect to the relationally, self-defining decisions
associated with baby markets.
60. See supra text accompanying note 28.
61. See supra text accompanying note 28.
62. See Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of "Coerced Parenthood" in
Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 Am. U. L. REv. 1021, 1049-52 (2004). But see NAS
GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at 67 (discussing varying attitudes of gamete donors to-
ward their donations from medical byproducts to parental concern).
63. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
64. Cf Sandel, supra note 17, at 94-95 (distinguishing objections to commodification
based on its devaluation from objections based on "coercion," where inequality can
push some to sell more readily than others); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note
19, at 1915 ("But we are situated in a nonideal world of ignorance, greed, and vio-
lence; of poverty, racism, and sexism."). See also infra Part III.
65. This is consistent with the fact that the law resists certain kinds of economic ex-
changes between individuals based on the nature of the relationship and the degree of
intimacy. For example, to preserve and protect certain kinds of intimacy, the law does
not condone certain financial exchanges, particularly those that help define the level
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To demonstrate fully the kind and extent of harm to human flour-
ishing that baby markets present would require a well-developed
normative vision of human flourishing that is beyond the scope of this
Article. 6 I do not offer such a vision beyond my claims about the con-
cerns regarding relational, personhood interests for a few reasons. First,
the notion that some things are so central to personhood and human
flourishing that they would be corrupted by markets challenges the
market-oriented view that all goods are commensurable. But as Sandel
has pointed out, "[i]t does not seem . . . possible, in general, to prove or
refute the thesis of commensurability, which is one of the reasons that
arguments by analogy play such an important role in debates about
commodification."67
Second, and more important, all things are not equal. Commodifi-
cation here, as in any other context, occurs against the backdrop of
many factors that influence the conditions of the exchange. If these
background conditions meant, for example, that such markets enhanced
the ability or opportunities for individuals to create families,8 prohibit-
of intimacy. Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV.
491, 493 (2005) ("The law's regulation of economic exchange between intimates,
which restricts but does not bar economic transfers, helps to define and construct the
legal understanding of intimacy, and to mark the dignity and specialness of intimate
relations."); id. at 507 ("The law governing nonmarital sexual relationships also de-
votes enormous energy to differentiating between relationships . . . [and] operates on
the assumption that a critical way to establish the worth and dignity of an intimate
relation is to stress the relation's detachment from the market and to prohibit some
forms of economic exchange between intimates."); id. at 511 ("The law of parent-
hood seeks to promote the specialness and dignity of the parent-child relation by
stressing its removal from the market and refusing to enforce certain economic trans-
actions," such as the buying and selling of children).
66. Even Margaret Radin, in developing her theory of personhood and property, relies on
a "pragmatically conceived" vision that draws on "particular values that are said to be
shared or are implicit in our society, rather than on some transcendent, abstract the-
ory of what is right." Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of
Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 351, 353 (1993)
(noting the appeal of her pragmatic approach but also pointing out its reliance on
consensus, which may not be as easy to establish on these points and both "obscures
the exercise of power . . . [and] tends to treat power as irresistible").
67. Sandel, supra note 17, at 104.
68. For example, they may increase the supply of reproductive material, and theoretically
reduce prices. See, e.g., Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 522 ("The supply of
gametes, like any other commodity, is a function of the available price and the rela-
tive demand."); Ethics Committee, supra note 30, at 218 ("[Plroviding financial
incentives increases the number of oocyte donors ..... ). But see Gregory Stock, Eggs
for Sale: How Much Is Too Much?, AM. J. BIOETHIcs, Dec. 2001, at 26, 27 ("[There
is no shortage of donors in general, just a shortage of donors with certain profiles of
intelligence, beauty, education, religion, and other factors."). Cf Michele Goodwin,
Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REv.
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ing such markets would be damaging to human flourishing. In those
cases, being unable to engage in such commerce would be much more
degrading than commodification itself.
Markets might enhance options for buyers and/or sellers, but they
might also negatively affect them. This raises empirical questions as to
whether and when being able to buy or sell embryos, gametes, or surro-
gacy services increases opportunities for relationally self-defining actions
on the part of both buyers and sellers. So although we may worry about
the damaging effects of baby markets on human flourishing, we cannot
evaluate baby markets as if the only issue is the intrinsic harm of com-
modification. It is impossible to separate out completely the intrinsic
harms of commodification from the consequential effects (positive or
negative) of commodification that turn on "background conditions
within which market exchanges take place. "6
My final reason for not offering a fully developed theory of human
flourishing is that the consequential harms of baby markets are equally,
and in some cases even more, troubling than the intrinsic harms. As I
argue in Parts III-VI, existing inequities, power imbalances, discrimina-
tion, the psychological aspects of infertility, an unregulated ART
industry, and unequal access to ART all potentially impact the self-
defining choices associated with baby markets even more than the mere
fact of commodification. Market preferences that favor anonymity and
prevent the child from learning her genetic heritage also threaten the
child's relational autonomy.70 Market preferences may also exacerbate the
tendencies to use ART for "eugenic" ends.7 ' Finally, even if baby markets
increase access to gametes and embryos, they cannot alone overcome the
various barriers to ART that its proponents imagine.72
As a result, the consequential effects of commodification can be es-
pecially threatening. Yet, as the title of this Article suggests, in spite of
these many concerns about intrinsic and consequential harms, I reluc-
tantly accept baby markets. Because I aim to remedy the consequential
harms of baby markets, I first explain my pragmatic response to baby
markets in Part II before I turn to the consequential effects of baby mar-
kets in more detail in Parts III through VI. In short, I explain why I
"give in" to baby markets.
305 (2004) (suggesting that legitimate organ markets can increase the supply of or-
gans). Some argue that baby markets allow certain marginalized individuals to access
reproductive materials they would otherwise be barred from obtaining. See Ertman,
supra note 15, at 1.
69. Sandel, supra note 17, at 95.
70. See infra Part IV.
71. See infa Part VI.
72. See infa Part V.
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II. GIVING IN TO BABY MARKETS
Despite my unease regarding markets, the reality is that markets
(black or otherwise) do exist in embryos, gametes, surrogacy services,
and other aspects of assisted reproductive technologies. Such markets
are in fact proliferating here and in other countries." Prohibiting these
markets may limit choice, which can also threaten human flourishing.
Moreover, approaches that try to theorize out the market are insuffi-
ciently attentive to real problems that must be dealt with given the
presence of these markets and are likely doomed to failure.7 ' This may
be a case where " [p]rohibition . . . carr[ies] moral and practical costs that
outweigh the good of preventing the practice."7
In addition, the elimination of commodification of gametes, em-
bryos, surrogacy services, and other aspects of ART is highly impractical.
Instead of having a price system to allocate rights and distributions of
these biological materials and services, they would have to be "gratui-
tously transferred at every stage of distribution, with the forces of
generosity (or a governmental entity) guiding tissue from its original
human source to its ultimate consumer."7 8 Because the distribution of
reproductive materials and services for ART involves so many actors, the
chain of gratuitous transfers "can only succeed if none of the partici-
pants acts to capture the available economic surplus by selling tissue,
and if the parties involved are able to solve the formidable logistical
73. Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163 (2002); see also
Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 520 ("Purchasing of organs in the interna-
tional market is widespread."); Ertman, supra note 15, at 7-26; Goodwin, supra note
68, at 358-65; CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 153.
74. Raekha Prasad, The Fertility Tourists, GUARDIAN, July 30, 2008, at 6 (describing the
global market in gametes and fertility tourism). In the United States, there is no fed-
eral legislation prohibiting the sale of gametes, and only a few states even address the
issue. Radhika Rao, Coercion, Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of
Compensation for Egg Donors in Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1055,
1057 (2006) ("Louisiana is the only state that explicitly prohibits the sale of human
oocytes while Virginia is the only state that explicitly authorizes the sale of human
oocytes.").
75. Holland, supra note 50, at 275-77 (arguing that incomplete commodification-
which lies between the extremes of "full commodification, in which everything is
bought and sold," and "complete noncommodification"-"offers regulation of the
market as a way of fostering vitally important aspects of our flourishing, such as con-
textuality, identity, and freedom.").
76. Cf Holland, supra note 50, at 276 ("[I]ncomplete commodification affords us a more
accurate reflection of the realities of our human transactions: we value both market
efficiency and the fullness of our personhood.").
77. Sandel, supra note 17, at 96.
78. Mahoney, supra note 73, at 197.
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problems of coordinating benevolent behavior.",7 At best this is likely to
be impractical, at worst, unworkable.o In addition, there is the risk that
the biological materials and services would be provided with greater lev-
els of waste and inefficiency."
Recognizing the costs82 and impracticalities of prohibiting markets,
how entrenched baby markets are, and the possible benefits they offer, I
give in to baby markets. That is to say, I reluctantly resist the prohibi-
tion of markets in spite of the many consequential harms of markets
such as (1) coercion, distorted decision making, and power imbalances
made worse by an unregulated infertility industry motivated by profit,
(2) market preferences that promote anonymity of sellers at the expense
of the future child's relational interests in learning about these sellers, (3)
barriers to accessing baby markets, and (4) eugenic-like effects of baby
markets. Instead, I argue strongly in favor of mechanisms to address
these threats, offering various approaches to minimize each of the con-
sequential harms. I recognize that some of my suggested fixes are more
easily achieved than others. In short, I recognize that "ideal theory. . .
may have to give way to nonideal theory."8 3 If baby markets are inevita-
ble, better that we allow them, but not that we accept them warts and
all.
My goal in advocating the regulation of markets is to bring the
world as close to ideal as possible. Of course, some of the intrinsic con-
cerns I raised will still exist. But given both the impracticalities and costs
of prohibiting markets, as well as the fact that certain background con-
ditions that can affect human flourishing will not disappear simply by
banning markets, this may be the price we have to pay. Since my re-
sponse to baby markets is not grounded in "ideal theory" but practical
realities, we should not let the best be the enemy of the good. As a re-
sult, we must choose the next best approach-one where we tend to the
79. Id. at 197-98.
80. Id. at 198 ("The number of human actors necessary to convert the recovered human
components into useful scientific and medical materials, combined with the fact that
many of these actors are unable or unwilling to forego financial compensation, means
that distribution systems based on gratuitous transfers are likely to prove unwork-
able.").
81. Id. at 199 ("The achievement of a genuine regime of noncommodification would"
mean that "[p]rofit-making and profit-seeking firms would withdraw, leaving the
field to governmental entities and to nonprofit firms that agreed not to take part in
bargained-for exchanges involving human biological materials," which "might cause
goods and services to be provided with greater levels of waste and inefficiency.").
82. See infra text accompanying notes 116-125.
83. Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: The Subject and Object of
Commodfication, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW
AND CULTURE 8, 14 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
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many consequential harms as well as we can, recognizing that our solu-
tions will not be perfect. Prohibiting commodification, as I shall show
below, will not alleviate many of the background conditions that raise
the consequential harms. Instead, it may increase the vulnerability of the
disempowered because we will have washed our hands of markets, ef-
fects and all.
As Parts III through VI will show, the consequential harms of baby
markets, in particular unfettered baby markets-driven by consumer
preferences and free of government regulation-can threaten the well-
being and sometimes even human flourishing of the various participants
in baby markets: sellers, buyers, and future children. In addressing the
consequential harms, I distinguish between commodification of repro-
ductive materials and completely free, unregulated baby markets. Many
defenders of baby markets advocate the latter, arguing against govern-
ment regulation, sometimes for very different reasons such as libertarian
impulses" or to prevent majoritarian values from infringing on minority
choices. 85
As I suggest in my exploration of each consequential harm, my re-
luctant willingness to allow a market in reproductive material is
premised on the promise of regulatory measures to address the dangers
of unfettered markets and to ensure that the choices of participants in
these markets are most likely to enhance human flourishing. It is a com-
promise that accepts the reality and sometimes even value of markets,
but which distrusts the ability of markets alone to avoid the consequen-
tial harms, particularly because markets can exacerbate harmful
tendencies and sometimes even create them. After describing each con-
sequential harm, therefore, I offer my suggested regulatory fix. It is quite
unabashedly a compromise of sorts to address the messy problems of a
messy world.
III. COERCION, DISTORTED DECISION MAKING,
AND POWER IMBALANCES
I begin with one of the biggest consequential effects of markets:
their potential to distort decision making unduly through coercion and
power imbalances. As is true of all of the consequential harms, it is not
context-specific in the way that claims of intrinsic harms are. In other
84. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Short-
age, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 342-46 (1978).
85. See Ertman, supra note 15, at 22.
86. See Sandel, supra note 17, at 94-95.
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words, this harm does not depend entirely on the moral importance of
the good being sold, but rather on the ways in which markets can influ-
ence behavior.8 ' The concern is that commodification may lead people
to make choices they might not otherwise make-in particular, choices
that are not in their best interests.8 Such coercion may be further exac-
erbated in the face of underlying inequities, where those who are
neediest may make choices they would not otherwise make because of a
need for money.89 Such a result would aggravate existing inequities by
increasing the flourishing of the advantaged at the expense of the disad-
vantaged. 90
Concerns regarding coercion are heightened when the reproductive
choices are tied to one's sense of self. We might worry, for example,
about the surrogate who originally intended to part with the baby she
has carried for nine months and now has a change of heart. Would fi-
nancial necessity, in some cases, drive her to relinquish her parental
rights in spite of bonding with the fetus and wanting to raise the child?
The harm would be especially serious. Not only would money have in-
fluenced a choice, but it would have done so with respect to a choice
that strongly implicates relational autonomy and that is deeply integral
to the self.91
Coercion is troubling even if lesser personhood interests are at
stake. The woman who wants to sell her ova may not have as deep a re-
lational connection to the ova. Nevertheless, she might not have
otherwise chosen to endure the burdensome process of taking hor-
mones, undergoing anesthesia, and facing possible long-term health
risks to retrieve the ova92 had she not needed the money.
An additional concern with markets here (and in other areas of
commodification) is their potential to exacerbate power imbalances,
87. See id. (comparing intrinsic harms of commodification with ones that depend on
background conditions).
88. Id. (describing the risks of coercion); cf Steinbock, supra note 35, at 262 (suggesting
that in most cases offers of large sums of money will not literally be coercive, but may
instead constitute "undue inducements").
89. Id.; see also JULIA DEREK, CONFESSIONS OF A SERLL EGG DONOR 164 (2004) (de-
scribing money challenges as the primary motivation in her and her friends' decisions
to sell eggs); Holland, supra note 50, at 272; Steinbock, supra note 35, at 258
("[M]ost women would not be egg donors for strangers without financial compensa-
tion.").
90. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 19, at 1916.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 130-137; Cf CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra
note 1, at 156 ("If we prohibit the sale of gametes, it must be [in part] because of...
a fear of economic exploitation of people who need money and are willing to sell
ANYTHING ..... ).
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which can distort decision making. Sellers in baby markets are, by and
large, more economically disadvantaged than buyers." Women with
plenty of economic resources, for example, are far less likely to go
through the physically arduous process of producing ova for sale or car-
rying a child for another couple, whereas women in need of money may
find this a reasonable tradeoff.94 Socioeconomic differences as well as the
circumstances of negotiating some of these sales may lead to further
power imbalances. For example, in the negotiation of surrogacy con-
tracts, the intended parents and their agents pay many of the relevant
expenses and control many aspects of the process." The buyers therefore
are in a position to "exert undue influence on the potential surrogate.0
In short, "the party who holds the most resources is the party who has
the greatest ability to manipulate the situation."7
But the power relationships in baby markets are complicated. As
Martha Ertman has described, the alternative insemination market in-
verts feminist concerns about gender power imbalances, when men are
sellers of gametes and the buyers include gay women.8 Moreover, the
kinds of structural imbalances that often arise in other contexts, where
93. See, e.g., Ethics Committee, supra note 30, at 217 ("[C]ollege students and other
women may agree to provide oocytes in response to financial need."); Paula M. Bar-
baruolo, The Public Policy Considerations of Surrogate Motherhood Contracts: An
Analysis of Three Jurisdictions, 3 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 39, 46 (1993) ("Data have
shown that the majority of women who apply to become surrogate mothers are from
low income brackets."); Carson Strong, How Should IVF Programs Handle Initial Dis-
closure of Information to Prospective Ovum Donors?, Am. J. BIOETHIcs, Dec. 2001, at
23, 23 ("[Alds that recruit donors are targeted toward groups likely to have economic
need, such as college students, which means that payments will often be a significant
incentive."). Of course this won't always be true. As the court noted in In re Baby M,
in spite of its concerns about coercion, "the Sterns [the intended parents] are not rich
and the Whiteheads [the surrogate and her spouse] not poor." In re Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988). See also Andrews, supra note 30, at 2365 ("Few surro-
gates are financially needy."); id. at 2349-50 (describing how Andrews interviewed
surrogates, "looking for evidence that the women had been exploited," and was "frus-
trated when the first surrogate mother [she] interviewed, an intensive care nurse, had
a higher income level than [her]"). Nevertheless, the court speculated "that it is
unlikely that surrogate mothers will be as proportionately numerous among those
women in the top twenty percent income bracket as among those in the bottom
twenty percent. Put differently, we doubt that infertile couples in the low-income
bracket will find upper income surrogates." Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1249.
94. See DEREK, supra note 89, at 164 (describing money challenges as the primary moti-
vation in her and her friends' decisions to sell eggs).
95. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Precommitment in Free-Market Procreation: Surrogacy,




98. Ertman, supra note 15, at 41.
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the buyers are institutions or corporations and the sellers are individuals,
are not always present here." The end-point buyers and sellers in baby
markets are usually individuals.'00
Buyers in baby markets, however, are also vulnerable participants.
The desire for a child can be overwhelming precisely because of the deep
personhood and relational autonomy interests at stake.'o' Many buyers
in baby markets are willing to go to great lengths and pay huge sums to
have a baby.10 2 For this reason, they may arguably be even more invested
in the sale of reproductive material than the seller, which can tip the
99. With respect to genetic information, for example, individuals are much more likely to
be sellers than buyers because their information has economic value to those who
may use it for research, pharmaceutical development, underwriting, etc., whereas the
genetic information of others does not usually have the same economic value to indi-
viduals. See N.I.H.-DEPT. OF ENERGY TASKFORCE ON GENETIC INFO. & HEALTH INS.,
GENETIC INFORMATION AND HEALTH INSURANCE 5 (1993) (describing the use of ge-
netic information in the insurance industry to underwrite risk); Christopher P.
Austin & Jack L. Tribble, Gene Patents and Drug Development: The Perspective From
Merck, in HUMAN DNA: LAW AND POLICY 379 (Barbara Maria Knoppers ed. 1997)
(discussing the use of genetic information within the pharmaceutical industry for
drug development). Some aspects of genetic information, however, may be of personal
value to individuals, who might want to know, for example, about health risks to
their future partners. See Nat'l Acad. of Scis., Social, Legal, and Ethical Implications of
Genetic Testing, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 375, 393-94 (Richard Sher-
lock & John D. Morrey eds., 2002) (discussing the disclosure of genetic information
to spouses). Of course, once the individual parts with his or her genetic information,
buyers and sellers who are similarly situated-researchers, companies, etc.-may buy
and sell valuable genetic information from one another, much like the doctrines of
first sale and exhaustion. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 2109, 2122 (2008) ("[A]uthorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a
patent exhausts the patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from invok-
ing parent law to control postsale use of the article."); see also 18 Am. JUR. 2D
Copyright and Literary Property § 100 (2009) (discussing the first sale doctrine).
100. See SPAR, supra note 4, at 35-46 (providing an overview of the fertility market). Of
course, agents may become involved in the transactions, complicating the power bal-
ances. See infra note 103.
101. Id. at 46.
102. Id. at 4 (describing the vulnerability of infertile couples who "will frequently pay
whatever they can. They will mortgage their houses, sell their cars, deplete family sav-
ings" because they are "desperate" to have a child); Spar & Harrington, supra note 3
at 44. Recently, the news has described examples of women trying to have children at
significantly advanced ages, in spite of the medical risks that their ages present. See
Patrick White, Woman, 60, Gives Birth to Twins-and Ethics Debate, GLOBE & MAIL,
Feb. 6, 2009, at Al (describing women giving birth at ages sixty to seventy years old).
Even more notorious is the much published case of Nadya Suleman, a woman who
was so desperate to overcome infertility, that she was willing to have six embryos im-
planted, Kimi Yoshino et al., Before the Octuplets, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 2009, at Al
(describing Suleman's extreme, even desperate, desire for a biological child), in spite
of the fact that the national average number of embryos implanted is 2.3, see Alan Za-
rembo et al., Octuplet Doctor's Record Dubious, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at Al.
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power balance in favor of the seller. Obviously, this power imbalance is
less likely to occur when buyers are not the end-point individual pur-
chasers, but are instead sophisticated brokers, whose only stake in the
transaction is profit.o3
Buyers in baby markets are also dependent on the sellers of infertil-
ity services to disclose the risks and limitations of the procedures
generally and at the particular facility.'O Many are willing to undergo
infertility treatments, even in the face of low (and often uncertain)
chances of success and uncertainty regarding long-term safety.' The
profit incentives in an unregulated infertility industry 06 create conflicts
of interest that can exacerbate this problem. Despite legal duties to dis-
close the risks associated with fertility treatment or limited success rates,
the desire to remain competitive may lead some providers or fertility
clinics to minimize the risks of fertility drugs or to overstate the pros-
pects of success with fertility treatments. 07 It may also, as seems to have
occurred in the Baby M case, discourage fertility clinics from disclosing
information about participants' vulnerabilities that might make them
poor candidates for participating in the buying and selling of fertility
services or products.0 o Profit motives can even prevent some buyers
103. DEREK, supra note 89 (describing personal experiences of selling eggs and working
solely with an egg broker).
104. See Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1
(1992) (requiring fertility clinics to report their success rate to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services); see also ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRIC
AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 11-14 (1985) (discussing the requirement of informed
consent for the removal, donation, and implantation of ovum); CAHN, TEST TUBE
FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 53-54 (noting that the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act was the first federal legislation that "applied explicitly to the repro-
ductive technology industry"). But in spite of federal reporting requirements, the
only sanction for failing to report success rates is to be listed "as a non-reporting re-
porting clinic in the CDC's annual report." Alicia Ouellette et al., Lessons From Across
the Pond: Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United Kingdom and the United
States, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 419, 427 (2005). See also CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES,
supra note 1 at 54.
105. Goodwin, supra note 2, at 21 ("Notwithstanding technological advancements and
that some pregnancies will result, ART's failure rate is estimated to be between 65%
and 80%.").
106. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES supra note 1, at 43-72 (describing how thin the
regulation is of the infertility industry). See generally Ouellette et al., supra note 104
(comparing America's lack of centralized, effectual regulation of the infertility indus-
try with England's comprehensive regulatory system).
107. Goodwin, supra note 2, at 22 ("[Slome doctors make exaggerated claims that they
can help 95% of patients conceive.").
108. A psychologist from the fertility clinic screened Mary Beth Whitehead before she
signed the surrogacy contract, but the Baby M court was deeply skeptical that this was
for her benefit. As the court points out,
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from accessing fertility services when clinics "striving for high 'success'
rates tend to refuse to take complicated fertility cases, thereby decreasing
the risks of a 'low' success rate or, conversely, increasing their statistical
pregnancy 'success' rates."' 09 In the context of infertility services, the
power clearly resides with the sellers.
The sellers of reproductive material such as ova may also fall prey to
power imbalances vis-i-vis providers of fertility services. Although phy-
sicians owe them the same obligation they owe any patient to promote
their best interests, 0 the fact that the women are not being treated for a
condition and that they offer the prospect of financial benefit to the fer-
tility clinics can create a conflict of interest."' This conflict of interest
may reduce the extent to which physicians promote these women's best
interests in general. Clinics that profit from ovum donors may minimize
The Sterns regarded the evaluation as important, particularly in connection
with the question of whether she would change her mind. Yet they never
asked to see it, and were content with the assumption that the Infertility
Center had made an evaluation and had concluded that there was no dan-
ger that the surrogate mother would change her mind.
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1247 (N.J. 1988). All Mrs. Whitehead was told was
that "she had passed." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, it was
apparent that the profit motive got the better of the Infertility Center. Al-
though the evaluation was made, it was not put to any use, and
understandably so, for the psychologist warned that Mrs. Whitehead dem-
onstrated certain traits that might make surrender of the child difficult and
that there should be further inquiry into this issue in connection with her
surrogacy. To inquire further, however, might have jeopardized the Infer-
tility Center's fee.
Id. at 1247-48.
109. Goodwin, supra note 2, at 23.
110. Ethics Committee, supra note 30, at 219; Mark V. Sauer, Egg Donor Solicitation:
Problems Exist, But Do Abuses?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Dec. 2001, at 1, 2 ("Donors are as
much our patients as the recipients we so eagerly serve. They too need our best efforts
and professional talents to safely guide them through a complicated and potentially
dangerous therapy.").
111. Andrea L. Kalfoglou, Navigating Conflict of Interest in Oocyte Donation, AM. J. Bio-
ETHICS, Dec. 2001, at la, la (2001) ("The nature of the relationship between an
oocyte donor and physician is difficult to characterize, but it is clearly not a typical
doctor-patient relationship."). This may depend on whether the recruiters are "ART
programs that recruit donors for use by recipients in the practice or . . . agencies that
recruit donors independently for practices and/or individuals." Robert G. Brzyski,
Putting Risk in Perspective, AM. J BIOETHICS, Dec. 2001, at 25, 25. In the latter case,
the financial conflict of interest is likely to be quite great. In the former, however,
donor egg cycles constitute "a small proportion of cycles in any given program.
Rather than being the source of easy money for ART programs, donor egg programs
are burdensome to administrate." Id. (finding in one study the "total cost to bring a
single donor into their program was approximately $1,869").
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or even fail to disclose certain risks associated with ovum donation.112
For example, one clinic has been reported to include information about
potential links to cancer in consent forms for IVF patients, while leaving
such information out of consent forms for oocyte donors."' In addition,
donors might be pressured to undergo procedures that maximize the
number of eggs retrieved, which can potentially increase the side effects
of the procedure."l Finally, some clinics try to maximize compliance
from donors by holding them legally responsible for the buyers' expenses
if the women do not complete the donation process.115
A. Arguments Against Prohibition
Given underlying inequities, various power imbalances between the
participants in baby markets, conflicts of interest, and the potentially
coercive influence of money, we should be concerned about commodifi-
cation of embryos and gametes in transactions that implicate varying
degrees of relational, personhood interests. We might prohibit baby
markets for fear that coercive influences make consent inherently invalid
and market exchanges de facto involuntary. But, while women driven by
economic necessity to sell eggs might not have made such a choice if
everything else were equal, they might well prefer selling eggs over tak-
ing a job that pays poorly and offers few rewards."' Similarly, while
infertile couples desperate to have a child might not have purchased re-
productive material if they could have a child naturally, they might well
prefer being buyers in this market over having limited reproductive op-
112. See Maggie Jones, Donating Your Eggs, GLAMOUR, July 1996, at 168, 170 ("After all
they want donors to participate in their programs. And the more these clinics convince
themselves that there's a horrible shortage of egg donors, the more likely they will cut
corners and recruit women faster than they should.") (quoting George Annas); see also
Jennifer Knox, Egg Sale Ends, SHEPHERD ExPREss (Univ. of Wis.-Milwaukee), July 9,
1998, at 8 (quoting a prospective ovum donor who asked an oocyte donor coordinator
about the safety of fertility drugs ad and was handed "a photocopied article entitled,
'Fertility Drugs Are Safe,' which supposedly ran in some magazine [she'd] never heard
of').
113. Jones, supra note 112, at 170.
114. Kalfoglou, supra note 111, at 2 (noting that twenty-seven percent of the thirty-three
ovum donors interviewed experienced side effects strong enough to keep them in bed
or from otherwise going about their daily lives, which researchers attributed to hyper-
stimulation syndrome, since the women had all donated more than twenty oocytes
despite being told that the usual retrieval amount is ten or twelve); Steinbock, supra
note 35, at 263 (describing how "it was not uncommon for clinics to 'flatter' donors"
about their super-fertility "to get them to be repeat donors").
115. Kalfoglou, supra note 111, at 2 (describing reports of such arrangements by donors).
116. Cf Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 19, at 1916.
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tions." 7 These psychological and economic pressures create a "double
bind." Circumstances may make otherwise undesirable choices compel-
ling, but prohibiting commodification does not overcome those
circumstances."' Prohibition of baby markets would merely limit the
options for dealing with economic need or infertility."9 It would limit
choices integral to the self, which can also threaten human flourishing.
Such a double bind of course exists with respect to the sale of other
things that we prohibit, such as prostitution. 120 While I do not want to
discuss the relative merits and demerits of banning prostitution, I raise
this point to emphasize that the mere fact that bad circumstances can
make an otherwise undesirable choice (like prostitution) compelling is
not in and of itself sufficient reason to legalize such choices. Much of
what motivates legislatures to ban prostitution concerns the kinds of
intrinsic personhood harms of selling something integral to oneself, in
this case one's body.12' As I suggested in Part I, personhood interests are
at stake with respect to the sale of reproductive material as well. But here
the gametes and embryos are less integral to oneself than one's entire
body. 12 As a result, the intrinsic harms associated with selling one's sex-
ual services seem greater than those associated with selling one's gametes.
Even more important, the sale of gametes or embryos furthers an
important aspect of human flourishing, allowing individuals who are
otherwise unable to create families to do so. While healthy sexual en-
counters can also contribute to human flourishing, a sexual encounter
based solely on the exchange of money is unlikely to and in fact may be
damaging to both the buyers' and sellers' sense of self.'23 Given that
"baby markets" may actually make it easier for some to achieve the goal
of creating a family,24 such markets can potentially enhance human
117. Cf supra text accompanying notes 101-102.
118. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 19, at 1915-16. Indeed, as one commentator
notes, "preventing excessive risktaking by banning payments, instead of through the
regulation of collection procedures and required disclosures of relevant hazards, is a
curious strategy." Mahoney supra note 73, at 213. Normally if it is found that people
are being exploited and exposed to unreasonable risk the response is to regulate the
actual procedure instead of forbidding payment for assumption of the risk. By merely
outlawing payment, the government is still allowing altruistic persons to be exposed
to the risk. Id.
119. Cf id. (noting that if we deny the neediest the option of becoming sellers in baby or
organ markets, without offering them other alternatives for dealing with economic
hardship, we have not done much to help them).
120. See id.
121. See id. at 1879-81; Sandel, supra note 17, at 95.
122. Cf supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
123. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 19, at 1879-81; Sandel, supra note 17, at 95.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 336-340.
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flourishing, especially for buyers. 125 Thus, in spite of the troubling as-
pects of commodifying gametes and embryos, several things argue in
favor of allowing these markets, including the "double bind" problem,
the attendant costs and impracticalities of prohibiting baby markets, 126
and the way that markets can further self-defining goals. 127
Rather than prohibit markets, we should bolster informed consent
law and impose certain safeguards to minimize the power balances and
distorted decision making that can arise in baby markets. Of course,
regulation cannot solve all problems. The potentially coercive influence
of financial necessity or desperation in baby markets cannot be entirely
overcome through regulation. We cannot realistically level the economic
playing field to remove the economic pressures that may influence deci-
sions to sell eggs or surrogacy services.12 And we cannot regulate away
deep and strong desires to have biologically related children. Some buy-
ers and sellers will necessarily participate in baby markets in the face of
such economic and/or emotional pressures.129 We are left then with the
next-best approach in a world of imperfection, where we do all we can
to enhance the decision making process so that consent is grounded in a
full understanding of the risks, benefits, and implications of participat-
ing in these markets, and where markets are regulated to minimize the
threat of conflicts of interest and power imbalances.
B. Informed Consent
This section addresses that next-best approach by focusing primarily
on the goal of helping participants in baby markets make self-defining
choices based on full awareness and understanding of the implications of
these choices. The kind of information essential to truly informed con-
sent for buyers of fertility services and sellers of ova, for example,
would of course include the physical risks associated with the proce-
dures, such as ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, 130 bleeding and
125. See Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation,
2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 136 (2001).
126. See supra text accompanying note 78-81.
127. See supra text accompanying note 68 and infra text accompanying notes 336-340.
128. See infra Part V.A.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 101-102, 116-119.
130. This condition is the result of fertility drugs and "can require hospitalization and may
be life-threatening. Severe cases occur in about 1 percent of women who have their
ovaries stimulated." Cook, supra note 114, at Al8. "An additional 10-20% of donors
develop moderately severe ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, which, although not
life threatening, is certainly unpleasant and at times debilitating." Sauer, supra note
110, at 1-2.
242 [Vol. 16:217
GIVING IN TO BABY MARKETS
infection, 31 stroke,132 and "very rarely, death."' 3  In addition, they
should know about the "controversial risk of ovarian cancer"1' as well as
the fact that many long-term risks are unknown.'3 1 Ova sellers also need
to know about the risks of unintentional pregnancy' and the potential
for secondary infertility.3 1
But physical risks are not all that is material. To make a truly
informed decision to participate in these markets, individuals must also
understand the known or possible psychological risks.38 This is an area that
has not been adequately researched.'39 One study of ovum donors found
that eight percent of those who were later unable to conceive experienced
some distress, knowing that someone else was possibly raising a child
genetically related to them."o Research of anonymous sperm donors or
people who relinquished their children for adoption suggests that the
psychological impact of selling or donating ova might lead to "experiences
of dislocation from genetic offspring, [as well as] desires to learn about
these children [and] to meet these children.""' Selling gametes might
affect future relationships where having children is contemplated.14 2 In
131. Luigi Mastroianni, Jr., Risk Evaluation and Informed Consent for Ovum Donation: A
Clinical Perspective, AM. J BIOETHICS, Dec. 2001, at 28.
132. Holland, supra note 50, at 270.
133. Michelle A. Mullen, What Oocyte Donors Aren't Told?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Dec. 2001,
at Ic, Ic.
134. Andrea D. Gurmankin, Risk Information Provided to Prospective Oocyte Donors in a
Preliminary Phone Call, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Dec. 2001, at 3, 3; Kalfoglou, supra note
111, at la.
135. Cook, supra note 114, at A18 ("The [fertility] drugs have not been studied well
enough, and so there is no way to adequately inform women of the risks they face.").
136. Ethics Committee, supra note 30, at 217 (noting that donors undergoing egg retrieval
must discontinue hormonal contraceptives).
137. Kalfoglou, supra note 111, at 1 a; Mastroianni, supra note 131, at 28 (Fertility drugs
present "the potential for a subtle, long-term effect on fallopian tube functions, with
consequent infertility.").
138. See Ethics Committee, supra note 30, at 218 (stating that the psychological risks of
ovum donation should be discussed when obtaining informed consent from donors).
139. Mullen, supra note 133, at Ic ("[T]here is little empirical data to describe the long-
term psychosocial effects, if any," associated with ovum donation).
140. Ethics Committee, supra note 30, at 217.
141. Mullen, supra note 133, at Ic. This claim, of course, extrapolates from the data on
two groups (biological parents who place their children for adoption and anonymous
sperm donors) to reach conclusions about the potential effects of donating ova. While
there are differences among the three groups, in all cases these individuals are geneti-
cally connected to a child they will not raise or have a relationship with. One could
imagine that the sense of genetic dislocation in the first two groups would likely arise
in the third group.
142. Id.; Ethics Committee, supra note 30, at 218 (describing the risks associated with
ovum donation as including future "desires to establish contact with genetically re-
lated children, desires that may be difficult or impossible to satisfy because of legal or
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addition, because these market transactions are intended to create
families, they have important legal implications regarding parental rights,
the enforceability of contracts, and the amount of information and
contact allowed between the various parties: intended parents, donors,
and future child."'
To ensure that both buyers and sellers can consent to these transac-
tions as meaningfully as possible, we need mechanisms to promote
deliberative decision making and to bolster the narrow protections of
informed consent. When buyers and sellers in baby markets interact
with the medical profession, they are protected by the legal requirements
of informed consent.' But existing informed consent law cannot
achieve the goals of full informed consent in this context for two rea-
sons: (1) it only requires the disclosure of a limited range of information
and (2) it goes only so far in ensuring full comprehension of risks and
benefits.
First, the law of informed consent only requires the disclosure of a
narrow range of information, excluding certain types of information
that would be crucial to a truly informed decision in baby markets. Or-
dinarily physicians are required to disclose information relevant to
medical interests, but not non-medical information."' Thus, while phy-
sicians must disclose material medical risks associated with ovum
retrieval, for example, they may not be legally bound to discuss the legal
implications of selling or buying a gamete or embryo.
In addition, it is not clear whether physicians are legally required to
disclose the psychological consequences or risks associated with donat-
ing an egg or embryo, acting as a surrogate, or undergoing implantation
of another's embryo. The law has had very little to say about whether
other barriers"). Some have also speculated as to the "serious potential 'risk"' of the
"emotional impact of subsequent infertility" in donors "even when the infertility is
completely unrelated to the earlier ovum donation procedures." Mastroianni, supra
note 131, at 28.
143. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 73-129.
144. The requirements of informed consent exist in all physician-patient relationships
regardless of the specific medical procedures. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMs 230-88 (6th ed. 2008).
145. In Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 600 (Cal. 1993), for example, the California Su-
preme Court rejected the lower court's ruling that "under the doctrine of informed
consent, a physician is under a duty to disclose information material to the patient's
nonmedical interests." The court emphasized that the informed consent doctrine is
premised on the right to control one's body and "presuppose[s] a therapeutic focus"
and "does not mean that [the doctor] is under a duty ... to disclose every contin-
gency that might affect the patient's nonmedical'rights and interests.'" Id. at 608-09.
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psychological risks should be disclosed to obtain informed consent.'
Depending on the jurisdiction, the standard of disclosure is based on
either what would be material to the reasonable patient or what reason-
able professionals would disclose (the standard of care). In
jurisdictions that use the reasonable-patient standard, a jury might be
persuaded that reasonable patients would consider this information ma-
terial. To my knowledge, however, no published case has so held. If
instead, the scope of disclosure is based on the professional standard,
much will depend on whether such disclosure has become the standard
146. See Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, the Genetic "Quick Fix," and the Jewish
Community: Ethicah Legal and Social Challenges, 7 HEALTH MATRIx 97, 106 (Psycho-
social risks "are not the traditional risks associated with an invasive, medical
intervention .... [S]ocial and psychological risks ... typically have not been the ma-
jor focus of the informed consent process"). Virtually all of the case law addressing
informed consent and psychological risks examines a different issue: the constitution-
ality of state laws that mandate the disclosure of psychological risks associated with
abortion. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir.
2006) vacated and remanded 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding the district
court's grant of a temporary injunction of a South Dakota law because the record
supported the finding that the mandatory disclosure requirements violated First
Amendment rights); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 472 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that
a Wisconsin statute requiring physicians to disclose specific information to a woman
undergoing an abortion, including the risks of "psychological trauma," does not im-
pose an undue burden on a woman's liberty interest in undergoing an abortion).
Arguably, the Supreme Court has treated informed consent with respect to abortion
differently from informed consent in other areas. See Rebecca Dresser, From Double
Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
1599, 1617 (2008) (noting that the Court has shifted from requiring abortion disclo-
sure laws to "conform to the general requirements of the common law informed
consent doctrine," to the "double standard" in which "states could emphasize risks of
and alternatives to abortion as a means of encouraging women to refuse abortion,"
and then to the "double bind" in which "neither the traditional disclosure standard
nor a heightened one offer[s] an adequate means of protecting women's interests").
Even the ABA's recent Model Act, which includes elaborate informed consent regard-
ing ART, does not discuss a need for disclosure of possible psychological risks
associated with the procedure. MODEL ACT Gov'G ASSISTED REPROD. TECH.
§ 201(2)(a) (2008) [hereinafter ABA Model Act].
147. "A slight majority of courts has adopted the professional disclosure standard [over the
reasonable-patient standard], measuring the duty to disclose by the standard of the
reasonable medical practitioner similarly situated." FURROW ET AL., supra note 144, at
240. Of the courts that use a patient-based standard, the vast majority of courts use
an objective test. Only a few courts apply a subjective patient-based standard, and
even then "the courts tend to leave room for deference to physicians." Jamie S. King
8 Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for Shared Decision-
Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429, 444 (2006). Oklahoma and Oregon seem to be
the only two jurisdictions that apply a true subjective patient-based standard. Most
courts reject the subjective test because it is "too abstract," leaves physicians "vulner-
able to patient bitterness" and to "patient hindsight." Id. Some even worry it "might
preclude recovery . .. if the patient died as a result of undisclosed risks." Id.
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of care, and whether courts would consider psychological risks to be the
sort of information physicians should legally be obligated to disclose. 8
In spite of the fact that some commentators and professional organiza-
tions call for such disclosure,"9 the lack of oversight makes it difficult to
determine how frequently this information is included as part of the
disclosure process.5 o Nevertheless, evidence suggests that informed con-
sent is lacking in this area generally.'
To promote deliberative decision making, we should focus not only
on the information that participants in these markets consider at the
moment they give consent, but also what information they receive (or
148. Because the professional standard examines what a "reasonably prudent practitioner"
would disclose, it essentially bases disclosure on the standard of care. King & Moul-
ton, supra note 147, at 441.
149. See Ethics Committee, supra note 30, at 218; Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for
Reproductive Med. & the Practice Comm. of the Soc'y for Assisted Reproductive
Tech., Elements to be Considered in Obtaining Informed Consent for ART, 86 FERTIL-
ITY & STERILITY S272-73 (2006) [hereinafter Practice Committees] (describing the
spectrum of information to be disclosed to individuals undergoing assisted reproduc-
tive technologies including "psychological issues" associated with ovum donation).
But see ABA Model Act, supra note 146 (failing to discuss a need to disclose the pos-
sible psychological risks associated with ART). In other contexts, commentators have
similarly argued that psychological risks associated with various procedures or diag-
nostic testing must be disclosed in order to make informed consent meaningful. See,
e.g., Gail Geller et al., Consensus Statement, Genetic Testing for Susceptibility to Adult-
Onset Cancer: The Process and Content of Informed Consent, 277 JAMA 1467, 1471
(1997) (arguing that people who undergo genetic testing for genes associated with
adult-onset cancer "should be informed of potential adverse responses in those found
to be mutation carriers such as anxiety, depression, anger, and feelings of vulnerabil-
ity" as well as guilt, survivor guilt, and regrets regarding prior life decisions); Nichola
Rumsey, Psychological Aspects of Face Transplantation: Read the Small Print Carefiuly,
Am. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 2004, at 22, 23 (describing the various "psychosocial
stressors, challenges and adaptive demands" associated with face transplants that
"must be conveyed and weighed-up if truly informed consent is to be achieved").
150. Sauer, supra note 110, at 1 ("[I]t remains unclear whether physicians heed such ten-
ets, because policing is nonexistent and sanctions have never been levied against
violators."). The fact, however, that a professional organization like the American So-
ciety for Reproductive Medicine believes that such information should be disclosed
could persuade a jury that this is the standard of care even if many physicians do not
in fact disclose such information.
151. Sauer, supra note 110, at 2 (describing his suspicion that physicians are not "receiving
proper informed consent" based on his membership on the Medical Advisory Board
to the New York State Task Force on Life and Law, which reviewed IVF programs in
New York and found "improvements were needed in executing informed consent,"
among other things); see also Kalfoglou, supra note 111, at Ic (describing interviews
with 33 oocyte donors and finding examples that "call into question whether the in-
formation provided was complete," although noting that even "three years later, most
of the women could recite a long list of potential physical complications, and others
discussed the psychological risks").
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do not receive) even before they step into a clinic. Ads soliciting ovum
donors, for example, encourage egg donation, but "never portray the
real-life activity" and its risks. 5 2 One study of nineteen oocyte-donation
programs found serious inadequacies in the disclosure process during
the initial phone interviews with prospective donors, including failure to
volunteer information, provision of inaccurate information, reluctance
to answer questions, and failure to send written information to prospec-
tive donors.' These initial encounters may influence the decision
making process in ways that lead donors to minimize the risks.'
Finally, in addressing the problems of coercion and decision mak-
ing in baby markets, we must also focus on helping participants
comprehend the information they receive. Deciding what should be dis-
closed is far easier than ensuring that patients fully understand what has
been disclosed. It is no surprise, therefore, that the law has focused pri-
marily on the latter. Physicians are not required to confirm that patients
understand the risks associated with a procedure, merely that physicians
disclose the relevant risks.' As many have noted, the legal protections
152. Sauer, supra note 110, at 1.
153. Gurmankin, supra note 134, at 4. The authors of the study warn that we should "re-
gard the results with caution," given that it was based only on a preliminary phone
call, the sample was "small and potentially biased" and the coding scheme was subjec-
tive. Id. at 10; see also Sauer, supra note 110, at 1.
154. Gurmankin, supra note 134, at 11-12. Studies have shown that people who are not
told about negative information until they agree to something are much more likely
to comply, than people who make judgments based on initial information, since the
latter "fail to adjust [their decisions] sufficiently for other information." In addition,
"potential kidney donors [make] their decisions about donating prior to and inde-
pendent of the disclosure process." Id. But see Brzyski, supra note 111, at 26 (noting
the irony that Gurmankin relies in part on evidence that shows that "information
provided during the consent process only occasionally influences medical decision
making"). These data raise important questions about how preliminary risk informa-
tion should be presented, both in terms of content and manner of disclosure. See
Rebecca Dresser, Donation, Disclosure, and Deception, AM. J. BIOETHIcs, Dec. 2001,
at 15, 15; Sauer, supra note 110, at 1 (arguing that he "would discourage nonmedical
personnel, who are usually the recipients of such calls, from engaging in such discus-
sions, if for no other reason than to lessen the likelihood of misinformation being
disseminated").
155. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cit. 1972) ("In duty-to-
disclose cases, the focus of attention is more properly upon the nature and content of
the physician's divulgence than the patient's understanding or consent. . . . [Tihe
physician discharges the duty when he makes a reasonable effort to convey sufficient
information although the patient, without fault of the physician, may not fully grasp
it. ... [T]he fact-finding process on performance of the duty ultimately reaches back
to what the physician actually said or failed to say.").
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have led to a thin process of obtaining consent that does little justice to
the underlying goals of informed consent.' 6
All of these problems require some retooling of informed consent
law in baby markets. First, we should ensure that the obligations of dis-
closure are sufficiently broad to encompass the kind of information that
is central to these decisions. Statutes might require the disclosure of cer-
tain kinds of information. For example, buyers and sellers should be told
of the known short- and long- term risks, the potential physical risks,
and the possible psychological implications of selling or buying repro-
ductive material, as well as the legal implications of these decisions,
including instances where the law is unclear about such things as paren-
tal status and the enforceability of certain arrangements.
In addition, we need mechanisms to minimize the potential coer-
civeness of recruitment efforts. One solution is to prohibit ads and other
solicitations from trying to entice prospective ova sellers or infertility
patients by describing, respectively, only the financial benefits or the
success rates of infertility treatment."' They must also disclose the
risks.' Similarly, we should require clinics to provide prospective ova,
sperm, or embryo donors with standardized information regarding the
physical, emotional, and legal consequences of such decisions even be-
fore they step into a clinic.6 o New York, for example, developed a
guidebook for egg donors, entitled Thinking about Becoming an Egg Do-
nor: Get the Facts Before You Decide.'' Requiring all egg donors to receive
such a document before attending a clinic would enhance the decision
making process.
156. See, e.g., Jay Katz, Informed Consent: Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 77-81 (1993) (describing informed consent in practice as lit-
tle more than a legal formality that does not honor the true goals of the doctrine).
157. See Andrews, supra note 30, at 2358 (noting that "the uncertain status of the law"
presents the biggest risk to children in the surrogacy context); ABA MODEL AcT, su-
pra note 146, at § 201(2)(c). In the context of genetic testing, some states mandate
the disclosure of specific information to ensure that consent to genetic testing is in-
formed. See 16 Del. C. § 1220(4) (2009); MCLS § 333.17020 (2009); R.R.S. Neb.
§ 71-551 (2009); N.Y. C.L.S. Civ. R. § 79-1; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-14-22
(2009).
158. See Ethics Committee, supra note 30, at 219.
159. See id. ("If financial or other benefits are noted in advertisements, the existence of
risks and burdens should also be acknowledged.").
160. Gurmankin, supra note 134, at 12; Stock, supra note 68, at 27.
161. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAw, THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG Do-
NOR? GET THE FACTS BEFORE You DECIDE! (2002) http://www.health.state.ny.us/
community/reproductive health/infertility/docs/1 127.pdf (noting that the guide-
book was created in response to research that revealed that "egg donors frequently are
not adequately informed about the process"); see also Sauer, supra note 110, at 2 (de-
scribing this effort as one of the only ones in the country).
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Legally mandating the scope of material information to be dis-
closed is only the first step. In addition, we must consider mechanisms
to make the process of informed decision making as meaningful as possi-
ble and to promote deliberative informed consent.162 New York again
offers a useful model. A task force drafted model consent forms to en-
sure some uniformity in the informed consent process among fertility
clinics."' Unfortunately, not many other states have followed suit.'6
These model consent forms are helpful in creating professional norms
and educating providers. But, in the context of a largely unregulated
infertility industry, mere guidelines may not adequately protect pa-
tients. 16 We need some teeth associated with the guidelines.
If we want decision making to be even more deliberative here,
however, the system must not rely solely on physicians, particularly
given their potential conflicts of interest and the fact that some of the
material information is not just medical. For example, the legal implica-
tions of these financial transactions extend beyond the medical sphere.
We cannot expect physicians to understand, let alone adequately dis-
close, the full legal implications of the decisions that buyers and sellers
are making in baby markets. Thus, we should consider requiring consul-
tation with attorneys so that participants in these markets can better
understand the legal implications.
Psychologists are appropriate participants as well. Professional
guidelines require psychological screening of ovum donors, for exam-
ple.166 Ideally, however, psychologists would do more than just screen
potential donors."' As a psychologist from a major IVF clinic described
162. Barbara Atwell, The Modern Age ofInformed Consent, 40 U. RicH. L. REv. 591, 597
(2006) (noting the inadequacy of the process of informed consent).
163. Sauer, supra note 110, at 2 (describing New York State's drafting of guidelines and
"model consents").
164. Id.
165. Id. (noting that such efforts are rare in the United States and generally go "unrecog-
nized" without "the authority of a mandate"); CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra
note 1, at 193 ("Finally, the professional organizations who are currently advancing
the state of regulation by proffering guidelines lack 'established mechanisms to police
compliance with these guidelines.' Membership and compliance are both strictly vol-
untary.").
166. Practice Committees, supra note 149, at S272; See also ABA MODEL ACT, supra note
146, at § 301(1) (requiring "[aill participants known to the ART provider [to] un-
dergo a mental health consultation in accordance with the most recently published
standards of the ASRM and SART prior to the ART procedure."); id. at § 302(2)
(requiring that participants are offered additional counseling from a mental-health
profession).
167. See supra note 108 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the ways in which the
mere screening of buyers or sellers is inadequate to protect the goals of informed con-
sent.
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it, given the financial conflicts of interest inherent in ovum donation,
"[m]y job is to talk donors out of it. That's not because we don't need
them, but we want to sleep at night."'6 Psychologists should help do-
nors understand their motivations in participating in this process. Are
they doing it for altruistic reasons, financial, and/or other reasons? Have
they considered the possibility that they may want to have contact with
the future child or that the future child might or might not want con-
tact with or information about them?169 What would it mean for them if
they couldn't? How would they feel if their fertility were affected by the
process? We might borrow from the field of genetic counseling, which
sees its role as not only providing information, but helping individuals
make decisions consistent with their values and life plans.o In addition,
information gleaned from such a psychological evaluation that is rele-
vant to the donor's ability to cope with the decision must be disclosed to
the donor."' Finally, we might also (or alternatively) rely on patient ad-
vocates to raise similar questions while also focusing on elements that
are not overtly psychological.172 They might, for example, ask women to
consider other potential sources of income if financial motives are driv-
ing their decisions.17 1
My suggestions for enhancing consent will not satisfy everyone.
Some have suggested that informed consent in this context is highly
problematic. The Baby M court reasoned, for example, that the surro-
gate's consent was "irrelevant"-that a surrogate can never make a
totally informed decision prior to the child's birth."' Whether one can
168. Jan Hoffman, Egg Donations Meet a Need and Raise Ethical Questions, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1996, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/08/us/egg-
donations-meet-a-need-and-raise-ethical-questions.html.
169. See infra Part IV.
170. See Anne L. Matthews, Genetic Counseling, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL,
AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 349-50 (Thomas H. Murray & Maxwell J.
Mehlman eds., 2000); Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28
Am. J. L. & MED. 233, 243 (2002).
171. ABA MODEL ACT, supra note 146, at § 203(4); see supra note 108 and accompanying
text.
172. Atwell, supra note 162, at 608 (suggesting that patient advocates could be an impor-
tant safeguard in ensuring that "emerging adults" contemplating procedures like
selling ova, offer truly deliberative consent to the procedure); Mastroianni, supra note
131, at 29 (arguing for patient advocates "who could better assess and review in ob-
jective terms the risks associated with the procedure and who would be less subject to
the pressures to provide as many oocytes as possible").
173. Atwell, supra note 162, at 609.
174. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988); see also Wilson, supra note 95, at
330 (arguing that "women who enter surrogacy contracts can never truly give in-
formed consent because there is no way that they can know before conceiving the
child how they will feel about giving up the child once the time comes").
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ever make such life altering, irrevocable changes before experiencing the
realities of one's choice is a very difficult problem. Yet it is not unique to
exchanges in baby markets. End-of-life decision making is fraught with
such dilemmas and yet the law has widely supported the notion of ad-
vanced directives. A now-competent individual can make legally
enforceable decisions with respect to life-sustaining treatment in the
event one's future self becomes incompetent, even if such determina-
tions result in the end of one's life."' Even non-medical decisions raise
similar problems. My decision to become a mother was not fully in-
formed, nor could it have been. I did not and could not understand
completely the physical and emotional challenges and sheer hard work
of parenting. But even less could I grasp the utter depth of love and ful-
fillment I would experience, which, even now, I find difficult to
comprehend.
Many, indeed most, important and difficult decisions require us to
take a leap of faith. We never fully understand what we are getting into,
yet we make such decisions all the time and the law enforces such deci-
sions.17' This does not mean, however, that we should give up on efforts
to try to understand our choices as fully as possible. We are better
equipped to make such important decisions if we are aware of their pos-
sible implications and if we have thought about what motivates us. 7
Again, we should not let the best be the enemy of the good. We may
never be able to comprehend perfectly what it means to make these
choices in advance of them, but we can come closer to that goal by be-
ing informed, deliberative, and self-aware.
Although I believe informed consent is an important element in
overcoming some of the coercive effects of baby markets, it is not suffi-
cient. As I suggest in the next section, an enormous contributing factor
to coercion, distorted decision making, and power imbalances in baby
markets is the fact that the infertility industry in America is motivated
by profit and essentially unregulated.17 1 Creating enforceable reporting
requirements and oversight of experimental approaches in the ART in-
dustry would go far in enhancing the decision-making process of buyers
and sellers in these markets. As I suggest below, greater regulation may
also offer much needed protections against risky procedures or ap-
proaches.
175. See ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE 7-20 (3d ed. 2004)
(describing the legal acceptance of advanced directives).
176. See Andrews, supra note 30, at 2363.
177. See Amanda Ratliff et al., What is a Good Decision?, 2 EFFECTIVE CLINICAL PRAC.
185, 187 (1999) (stating that good decisions "should be well informed").
178. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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C. An Unregulated Infertility Industry
An additional background factor that we must consider in the de-
bate about baby markets is the fact that the ART industry in this
country is a $3 billion industry,179 which is highly privatized, moti-
vated largely by profit8 o and, more important, lacking in "consistent
oversight."... Unlike England, for example, which has a comprehen-
sive, authoritative and centralized regulatory body-the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA)-the United States
has "no comprehensive policy [that] governs ART."' 82 Instead we have
just "a patchwork of . . . state and federal regulation that essentially
leave the U.S. fertility industry unregulated."'8  We have no enforce-
able reporting requirement and no licensing or accreditation
requirements for ART.' Moreover, at the federal level, we lack any
regulation regarding sensitive issues concerning ART, and at the state
level, "regulations of ART lack consistency and are rarely well devel-
oped in any particular state."' 86 The closest things we have to any kind
179. Valdez, supra note 34, at 1; CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 1.
180. Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 430 (describing the United States reproductive
technology industry as "driven by commercial success and consumer behavior").
181. Id. at 419 (noting that to the extent the ART industry is regulated, it is in a piece-
meal way, often without any enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance); CAHN,
TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 44-45 (noting the limited internal and external
regulation of ART).
182. Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 435 (describing our system as a "patchwork" and
"essentially ... unregulated" system).
183. Id.; CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 52, 59-62 (noting the void at both
the federal and state level, and noting that although some state laws require screening
of egg and sperm donors, no regulations exist for the number of implantations doc-
tors may perform for an IVF cycle, or the number of donations per donor).
184. Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 423-28 (noting that although U.S. law requires
fertility clinics to provide data on success rates to the Centers for Disease Control, the
CDC has no authority to enforce this requirement); CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, su-
pra note 1, at 54. In contrast, the British HFEA oversees comprehensive data
collection regarding infertility clinics. Ouellette et al., supra note 104 ,at 423 (describ-
ing the HFEA registry as "the largest of its type in the world").
185. Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 429 ("[N]o U.S. law requires licensing or
accreditation of ART programs or embryo laboratories."); CAHN, TEST TUBE
FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 54 (describing the Model Program for the Certification of
Embryo Laboratories, which was released in 1999, and yet "it does not appear that any
state has actually adopted it"). In contrast, the HFEA licenses fertility clinics and labora-
tories that use gametes and embryos for research and has the authority to enforce
licensing requirements. Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 428 (describing the HFEA's
authority to license in three areas: fertility treatment, embryo storage, and research on
human embryos or gametes).
186. Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 432-33.
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of oversight are the guidelines regarding specific issues related to fertil-
ity services published by the American Society of Reproductive
Medicine.18 1 Our "private capitalistic health care system"188 and the in-
fertility industry's strong efforts to self- regulate have contributed to
this lack of regulation.8
When profit drives the industry, the lack of regulation is particu-
larly problematic in several ways. First, it limits the collection and
analysis of important data regarding reproductive technologies. With-
out enforceable regulations, incentives are few for providers of fertility
treatment or brokers for ovum donors to report or fully record their
experiences with ART.o90 Inadequate data regarding the risks, effects,
and success rates of infertility treatments generally, and specifically
with respect to individual providers and fertility clinics, is problematic
to buyers and sellers in this market. It reduces their ability to make
truly informed decisions because they do not know the full spectrum
of risks, benefits, or the (often limited) success rates of these proce-
dures, generally, or at a particular clinic. 91
In addition, without adequate oversight and regulation of the
fertility industry, profit motives may drive self-interested and unethical
providers toward practices that are unsafe or unethical or may prevent
them from providing honest or accurate accounts of the risks or
187. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 538; CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note
1, at 62-64 (describing the industry's self-regulation).
188. Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 433.
189. Sandra Carson, Chief, Baylor Coll. Assisted Reproductive Tech. Program, & President,
Am. Soc'y. for Reproductive Med., Remarks at Meeting of the President's Council on
Bioethics, Session 5: Biotechnology and Public Policy: Professional Self-Regulation
(Mar. 7, 2003), http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/march03/mar7full.html.
190. See Ouellette et al., supra note 104; CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 54
(noting how implementation of the reporting requirements "has not been particularly
speedy or protective of consumers"). Some of the most well-known infertility clinics
have been the biggest offenders of failing to report. Numerous factors may influence
the decision not to report success rates such as "the lack of solid criteria to correctly
identify the etiology of infertility, an imprecise separation of clinical indications, and
the inherent bias in the reporting structure toward pregnancy rates as the sole arbiter
of a clinic's success." Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 427. Surprisingly, however,
the physician involved in the highly controversial implantation of six embryos, which
resulted in Nadya Suleman's delivery of octuplets, did report his success rates, even
though they were "one of the worst success rates of any fertility clinic in the country."
Zarembo, supra note 102, at Al.
191. In addition, as noted, the conflict of interest gives sellers of infertility services and egg
brokers little incentive to focus on risks that may dissuade potential consumers of in-
fertility services or donors of ova (or sperm) or surrogates. See supra text
accompanying notes 106-113.
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success rates of their practices.19 2 In fact some clinics have misled
couples about ART success rates by using "criteria such as the number
of eggs retrieved, number of eggs fertilized, or number of embryo
transfers to tout success, rather than the number of live births." 193
Further, as noted earlier, financial interests may lead providers to
pressure egg sellers to do things to maximize egg-retrieval such as
undergoing numerous cycles of egg-retrieval or taking high doses of
hormones.'" Similarly, as evidenced by the recent birth of octuplets to
a woman who had had six embryos implanted at once, providers may
be tempted to implant large numbers of embryos to maximize the
chances of successful ART treatment, even if this may pose health
hazards to some patients.'" And, as noted earlier, providers may use
threats of legal or financial liability to induce donors to complete the
donation process.'" In short, our system allows the "unscrupulous
practices of unethical providers who have made headlines and eroded
confidence in the U.S. system." "7
An additional concern with limited regulation is that assisted re-
productive technologies are ever advancing and physicians may
experiment with new procedures or approaches, which some call
192. See Goodwin, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that research has largely ignored the conse-
quences of financial conflicts of interest experienced by doctors); Ann Bindu
Thomas, Avoiding Embryos "R" Us: Toward a Regulated Fertility Industry, 7 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 247, 270 (2008) (proposing that fertility facilities be required to be
nonprofit entities to discourage clinics from taking advantage of the vulnerable). Cf
supra text accompanying notes 111-115.
193. Judith F. Daar, ART and the Search for Perfectionism: On Selecting Gender, Genes, and
Gametes, 9 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 241, 254-55 n.34 (2005) (describing testimony
from witnesses who testified at hearings on the bill that became the Fertility Clinic
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992).
194. See supra text accompanying note 114.
195. See Zarembo, supra note 102; see also B. Jason Erb, Deconstructing the Human Egg:
The FDA s Regulation of Scientifically Created Babies, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv.
273, 288-89 (1999) (stating that fertility doctors do not follow medical guidelines to
avoid having to reimburse patients in accordance with clinics' money-back guaran-
tee); Cheryl Erwin, Utopian Dreams and Harsh Realities: Who Is in Control ofAssisted
Reproductive Technologies in a High-Tech World?, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 621,
630-31 (2006) (discussing clinics' incentive to implant large numbers of embryos to
increase their success rate); Stacey Pinchuk, A Difficult Choice in a Different Voice:
Multiple Births, Selective Reduction and Abortion, 7 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 29,
51-52 (2000) (discussing fertility clinics' incentive to implant large numbers of em-
bryos as created by money-back guarantees); cf CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra
note 1, at 61 (noting that "[n]o regulations govern the number of implantations an
infertility clinic may perform per tVF cycle").
196. See supra text accompanying note 115.
197. Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 435; see Zamembo, supra note 102.
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"clinical innovation."' Physicians often view this as treatment.'" In-
deed, technically it is not research as defined under the federal
regulations protecting human subjects.2 00 The law does require physi-
cians to inform patients that they are "participating in an experimental
procedure" and to discuss the associated uncertainties regarding risk and
success. 20 1 If, however, they view the procedures as treatment, rather
than research, physicians may choose not to discuss the experimental
aspects of the procedure. If patients participate in experimental treat-
ments without consenting, we have done serious harm to their
202
autonomy interests.
Finally, the lack of regulation in a profit-driven industry also raises
concerns about safety issues when individuals undergo experimental fer-
tility procedures. If infertility clinics engage in experimentation
198. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 144, at 386-90 (describing how the term "clinical
innovation" originated in the context of medical malpractice litigation as a defense to
a claim that the doctor's treatment deviated from the standard of care); Jesse A.
Goldner, An Overview ofLegal Controls on Experimentation and the Regulatory Impli-
cations of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 63, 66 (1993)
(describing this as "innovative treatment [which] is a deviation from standard prac-
tice, the efficacy or safety of which has not yet been validated").
199. See Nancy M.P. King, The Line Between Clinical Innovation and Human Experimen-
tation, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 573 (2002) ("[D]rawing a line between human
experimentation and medical treatment is surprisingly difficult, not only for patients
but also for physicians.").
200. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2008) (defining research as "a systematic investigation ...
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge").
201. Goldner, supra note 198, at 88 ("[E]ven if what is being done with the patient is not
part of a formal experimental design, the patient is entitled to know that the drug or
procedure has not been accepted as standard, to be informed of whatever known risks
may be involved, and that other risks may not be known."). But see Karp v. Cooley,
493 F.2d 408, 420-24 (5th Cir. 1974), in which a family of a patient, who had a
heart transplant and allegedly was not told that the device in question was "com-
pletely experimental," sued the physician for failure to obtain informed consent. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal because the physician had disclosed sufficient
information regarding the nature of the procedure and there was "no evidence that
Mr. Karp's treatment was other than therapeutic." Id. at 423. As a result, it con-
cluded that "in this context an action for experimentation must be measured by
traditional malpractice evidentiary standards." Id. at 423-24.
202. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMED. & BEHAV-
IORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH § B.1 (1979), available at
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html. Of course, the patient is not with-
out potential recourse and could bring a cause of action against the physician for
failure to obtain consent. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 144, at 232 (discussing the
legal basis of informed consent actions); Goldner, supra note 198, at 80-87 (describ-
ing actions brought against physicians for failure to obtain informed consent for
"'therapeutic' clinical research").
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(whether it is clinical innovation or systematic research) and do not rely
on federal funds for research, they are not bound by the federal protec-
tions of human research-also known as the Common Rule.203 Thus,
end-point buyers, sellers, and the future children will not benefit from
the federally mandated oversight process, which requires not only ade-
quate informed consent from research participants, but also an adequate
scientific basis for the research, an appropriate balance of risks and bene-
fits, minimization of risks, and, when necessary, monitoring to ensure
the safety of the research participants.204
All of these concerns demonstrate the ways in which unregulated
baby markets impose costs on society, not all of which buyers internal-
ize. Inadequate information about the long-term effects and efficacy of
ART procedures means that the price of gametes, embryos, and the
medical procedures accompanying ART may not accurately reflect the
risks and benefits to both buyers and sellers. 205 Latent, and perhaps un-
known, health risks associated with the procedures used to obtain
206gametes impose costs (both in terms of future medical costs and lost
203. The federal regulations apply only to research performed or funded by the United
States government or subject to "regulation by any federal department or agency," as
defined in § 46.102. 45 C.F.R. %§ 46.101-02 (2008) ("[T]his policy applies to all re-
search involving human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to
regulation by any federal department or agency which takes appropriate administra-
tive action to make the policy applicable to such research. . . . It also includes research
conducted, supported, or otherwise subject to regulation by the federal government
outside the United States.").
204. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2008) (describing the criteria for approval of research, including
that "risks to subjects are minimized ... [b]y using procedures which are consistent
with sound research design and which do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk,"
that "[r]isks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to
subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to re-
sult," that "[i]nformed consent will be sought from each prospective subject or the
subject's legally authorized representative," and that "[w]hen appropriate, the research
plan makes adequate provision for monitoring the data collected to ensure the safety
of subjects . . . [,] to protect the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidential-
ity of data.").
205. One argument against leaving certain activities solely to market forces is that these
activities "involve costs that cannot be reduced to money and hence cannot be the ba-
sis of a free market choice." GUIDO CAiABREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 97 (1970).
Even if the marketplace could make the efficient choice among acts and activities,
such a valuation is impossible because many "costs ... cannot be measured in purely
monetary terms." Id. In addition, market forces may not allocate resources efficiently
if individuals are not "able to estimate accurately the risk" associated with an activity
before the risk manifests. Id. at 103.
206. See generally INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L AcADs., As-
SESSING THE MEDICAL RISK OF HUMAN OocYrE DONATION FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH
(2007), available at http://www.nap.edulcatalog?record id= 11832 (discussing medical
and psychological risks associated with egg donation). See also Helen Pearson, Health
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productivity) that buyers externalize. For example, ART imposes costs on
society that are rarely acknowledged such as "higher labor and delivery
costs ... , higher neonatal costs,... and possibly even higher educational
costs as children who were born prematurely or at below-normal weights
enter the public schools system. 207 In addition, unregulated baby markets
impose potential costs on the future children, both in terms of potential
long-term health problems and, as I shall discuss in more detail in Part IV,
anonymity provisions that prohibit the future child from learning about
the donors of the gametes or embryos. Buyers externalize these costs as
well.
A clear solution to most of these concerns is better public oversight
of the fertility industry. England's system of broad oversight and com-
prehensive regulation achieves that goal.208 Indeed, many commentators
have argued for implementing a regulatory system in the United States
much like England's.209 I would strongly advocate such a model, which
shifts the focus from a privatized, profit-driven industry to more of a
public-health model. But there is some reason to be skeptical about the
ability to implement such a regulatory scheme given the politics and
culture of America. England's comprehensive regulation of assisted re-
productive technology fits easily within its centralized and heavily
Effects of Egg Donation May Take Decades to Emerge, 442 NATURE 607, 607-08
(2006) (discussing the lack of conclusive information about the health effects of egg
donation).
207. Spar & Harrington, supra note 3, at 59.
208. See Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1623-
24 (2008) (discussing the United Kingdom's "comprehensive regulatory scheme" for
regulating Assisted Reproductive Technology); Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at
422-34 (comparing the regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology in the
United Kingdom and the United States).
209. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY, THE
REGULATION OF NEw TECHNOLOGIES 9-10 (2004), http://www.bioethics.gov/re-
ports/reproductionandresponsibiity/_pcbejfinal-reproduction andresponsibility.pdf
(recommending monitoring and oversight of ART in this country to replace the patch-
work regulation we currently have); James F. Childress, An Ethical Defense of Federal
Funding for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETH-
ics 157, 163 (2001) (suggesting that the United States might need a regulatory body
liked that of the U.K. to oversee embryonic stem cell research); Weldon E. Havins &
James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap Between the Science ofArtificial Reproduc-
tive Technology and the Laws Which Govern that Technology, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 825
(1999); Robert L. Stenger, The Law and Assisted Reproduction in the United Kingdom
and the United States, 9 J. L. & HEALTH 135, 159 (1994-95) (arguing that the UK's
HFEA can guide U.S. efforts to address assisted reproductive technology); CAHN,
TEST TUBE FAMILIEs, supra note 1, at 236 (arguing for a system like England's man-
datory reporting of ART procedures which children have access to upon reaching the
age of majority); Id. at 196 (arguing for limits on the number of embryos that may be
transferred, as in England).
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regulated healthcare industry.210 In contrast, the United States' health-
care system has long resisted such an approach, not just with respect to
infertility, but with respect to healthcare generally.211
Because of the concerns regarding coercion and distorted decision
making, one of the primary goals in regulating baby markets should be a
mandate to collect and analyze relevant data regarding the risks and suc-
cess rates of assisted reproductive technologies.212 Ideally, the data would
address not only short- and long-term physical risks associated with the
various procedures but also the psychosocial issues. In addition, the fo-
cus of the research must be on the sellers (of ova, sperm, embryos, and
gestational surrogacy services), the buyers (the recipients of these repro-
ductive materials and/or services), and of course the resulting children.
Although American law requires infertility clinics to report data on
their procedures, these requirements are virtually unenforceable.213 Mak-
ing such requirements enforceable would be a starting point. To give
teeth to otherwise meaningless requirements, we might impose penalties
for reporting violations. Liability schemes too might create some level of
incentive. This approach, however, would require patients to pursue
such claims and to demonstrate failures within the system, which might
be difficult and burdensome for them. Alternatively, we might consider
a market-driven, carrot rather than stick, approach. Financial incentives
such as tax credits might encourage clinics to collect and report the rele-
vant data and even to participate in large-scale research about the effects
of and success rates of various treatments.214 Such incentives would go
210. Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 422-34. "The [English ART regulation] is success-
ful in the U.K. in part because of the tradition of national control over health care,
which is viewed as a public, not a private commodity. Patients and providers in the
U.K. accept government regulation of virtually every kind of health care issue." Id. at
444. See also CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 20 ("Although there is
much more oversight of the industry in other countries, many of them (England,
Australia, and France) have government-provided medical care, so the population
may be more accustomed to government regulation of its health care" than the popu-
lation in the United States, where "individual states, rather than the federal
government, are primarily responsible for regulating the medical profession and the
family law issues posed by ART.").
211. See Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 434-42.
212. See Spar & Harrington, supra note 3, at 65.
213. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
214. The use of tax credits to incentivize behavior is well known in medicine. Such a strat-
egy has been employed to change behavior ranging from the individual purchase of
health insurance to private research and development. See Belinda L. Heath, The Im-
portance of Research and Development Tax Incentives in the World Market, I 1 MICH.
ST. U.-DETROIT C.L. J. INT'L L. 351, 352 (2002) (discussing the use of tax credits to
encourage research and development of pharmaceutical products); Alec G. Kara-
katsanis, Health Insurance in America: Providing Substance to America's Values, 11
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much further than the current one: to avoid "being listed as a non-
reporting clinic in the CDC's annual report. 2 15 Whether through direct
regulation or indirect incentives, a crucial remedy to some of the harms
of baby markets would be to bring the much overdue centralized analy-
sis of data to the American infertility industry, something markets alone
216have not achieved.
In addition, we should expand the federal regulations of human
subject research to cover experimental treatments conducted in the pri-
217
vate sector. Again the British model offers some guidelines for greater
oversight: the regulatory body must approve the implementation of new
211techniques. Whether we expand the scope of the entities regulated by
the Common Rule or make specific requirements for oversight of re-
search in this area, we must demand greater protections for those who
are patients and research subjects in this industry.
Additional regulations should address the health risks associated
with buying and selling reproductive materials in baby markets. For
example, regulations might set limits on the dosages of fertility drugs to
decrease the possibility of side effects like hyperstimulation syndrome.219
Similarly, if data suggest that the health risks associated with ovum
retrieval are cumulative, it may be appropriate to limit the number of
lifetime ovum donations that a woman may undergo.220 Again, the
MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 337, 361-62 (2007) (discussing the use of tax credits to
encourage the purchase of private health insurance).
215. Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 427; see also note 104.
216. In essence, I am suggesting that the existing social norms of self-regulation have not
adequately achieved these goals.
217. DANIEL D. FEDERMAN ET AL., RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO
PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 47 (2003) (recommending that "every organi-
zation sponsoring or conducting research with humans" should be subject to federal
regulations protecting human research participants); NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY
COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICI-
PANTS 40 (2001) ("Federal policy should cover research involving human participants
that entails systematic collection or analysis of data with the intent to generate new
knowledge.").
218. The UK regulatory system requires programs that apply for licenses from the HFEA to
comply with the Act and the Code of Practice, which describes acceptable and unac-
ceptable practices for the treatment of infertility and embryo research. See HUMAN
FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., CODE OF PRACTICE 1.3 (7th ed. 2008), available
at http://cop.hfea.gov.uk/cop/pdf/CodeOfPracticeVR_4.pdf; Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 3(1) (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
actsl990.htm.
219. See Cook, supra note 114, at A18 (noting that Harvard's protocol for obtaining ova
from women for stem cell research requires estrogen levels to "be kept fairly low" to
minimize the risk of hyperstimulation syndrome).
220. Cf CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 61 (noting that there is no regula-
tion limiting the number of donations per donor). Based on her personal experiences
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British model is compelling for its ability to analyze data on health risks
221
and then to draw upon experts to regulate or prohibit certain actions.
Moreover, because sellers in baby markets do not personally benefit
from the medical procedures they undergo, they, like research subjects,
should have the ability to withdraw from the gamete retrieval process
without financial or legal penalties,222 which would reduce some of the
power imbalances at work in these markets.
While my suggestions are potentially difficult to implement in an
industry loathe to be regulated and in a country skeptical of the gov-
ernment's presence in such personal matters, healthcare has historically
been regulated by the state to protect the well-being of its citizens.223
With so many participants potentially vulnerable to the forces of baby
markets, we have an obligation to ensure their ability to participate with
full understanding of the risks involved, as well as to be protected from
the power imbalances and coercive influences of the market.
IV. RELATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ANONYMITY OF DONORS
Baby markets not only threaten the well-being of buyers and sellers,
but also potentially the well-being of children born through assisted re-
productive technology. First, if profit motives in an unregulated industry
drive some to engage in practices that are potentially physically risky to
future children, this alone is a significant concern. A more indirect
as a "serial egg donor," Julia Derek has argued for an age cut-off of 25 for ovum do-
nors, which would have the effect of limiting how many eggs they could donate.
Personal communications with Julie Derek, Nov. 2006, roundtable, Baby Markets:
Money, Morals, and the Neopolitics of Choice at DePaul University.
221. See Ouellette et al., supra note 104, at 442-43 (discussing how the United Kingdom
used the scientific work of health experts regarding the risks of multiple births to
limit the number of embryos that could legally be implanted).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 115, 115, 196; ABA MODEL Acr, supra note 146,
at § 201(2)(a) (suggesting that informed consent requires a "statement that the pa-
tient retains the right to withhold or withdraw consent at any time prior to transfer of
gametes or embryos without affecting the right to future care or treatment or risking
the loss or withdrawal of any program benefits to which the patient would otherwise
be entitled.").
223. See William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and Health Care Regula-
tion, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 137, 141-46 (discussing the history of the healthcare
industry and its regulation by government).
224. Just as we may worry that financial conflicts of interest could reduce the extent to
which some physicians promote their patients' best interests, we might also worry
that such conflicts of interest could push some physicians to take undue risks with re-
spect to the future children. Some studies describe the potential health risks to
children born of IVF. See Gina Kolata, Picture Emerging on Genetic Risks ofIVF, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at D1 (describing "a paper reporting that babies conceived
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harm is to the personhood and relational self-definition of the future
children when markets indirectly deprive them of the opportunity to
learn important information about their genetic heritage. In this coun-
try, baby markets reflect the preferences of the buyers and sellers, which
has created a presumption in favor of the anonymity of those who sell
reproductive material.225 The markets have not, however, captured the
interests of the children since they are not participants in these transac-
tions. Regulation of baby markets is necessary to address the conflicting
interests between the participants in these markets and the resulting
children. Moreover, in addition to being the right thing to do, attending
to this problem addresses the fact that the costs of anonymity to the re-
sulting children are often externalized in the existing unregulated
market.26
Although "there is no legislation, at either federal or state level, that
either prohibits or enforces anonymous gamete donation,"2 27 the market
favors anonymity. From the inception of artificial insemination, ano-
nymity and secrecy have been the norm.228 The majority of individuals
who use gametes to conceive do not disclose this fact to their children,229
with IVF, or with a technique in which sperm are injected directly into eggs, have a
slightly increased risk of several birth defects, including a hole between the two
chambers of the heart, a cleft lip or palate, an improperly developed esophagus and a
malformed rectum"); Sonia M. Suter, The "Repugnance" Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart
and Other Theories of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technolo-
gies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1514, 1523 (2008). Unfortunately, we know little
about "the effects on children born through collaborative reproduction .... because
so few studies have addressed the topic." Helen M. Alvard, The Case for Regulating
Collaborative Reproduction: A Children's Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1,
43-44 (2003). We would not want profit incentives to encourage physicians to push
the technology in directions that could pose even greater risks to children.
225. See infra text accompanying notes 228-233.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 208.
227. Lucy Frith, Gamete Donation and Anonymity: The Ethical and Legal Debate, 16 Hum.
REPROD. 818, 819 (2001).
228. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 514; see also A. McWhinnie, Gamete Donation
and Anonymity: Should Offipring from Donated Gametes Continue to be Denied Knowl-
edge of Their Origins and Antecedents?, 16 Hum. REPROD. 807, 807 (2001) ("Donors
were anonymous, assured of confidentiality. Recipients were encouraged to keep AID
secret and not to tell the child."); id. at 811 (describing "the extreme secrecy over the
60 years of" the practice of artificial insemination by donor).
229. Glenn McGee et al., Gamete Donation and Anonymity: Disclosure to Children Con-
ceived with Donor Gametes Should Not Be Optional, 16 Hum. REPROD. 2033, 2033
(2001) (noting that one study found that "86.5% had not told the child and did not
plan to tell and 40% had told no one at all") (citing Susan C. Klock & Donald
Maier, Psychological Factors Related to Donor Insemination, 56 FERTILITY & STERILITY
489, 491-92 (1991)). The interest in secrecy, however, varies depending on whether
ART occurs in the context of a heterosexual or homosexual couple. While heterosex-
ual couples strongly favored secrecy so they could "mimic the natural family . ...
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often to avoid revealing their infertility.230 In addition, professional so-
cieties recommend that gamete donors remain anonymous,23 1 sperm
bank contracts "routinely provide" for anonymity,232 and internationally,
"the vast majority of countries endorse anonymous gamete donation."23
These practices, however, are not uniform and seem to be evolving,
especially outside the United States. Some clinics offer "an exclusively
known service" and others offer the choice of anonymous or non-
234
anonymous sperm donation. Such choices are commonly used in oo-
235
cyte donor programs in the United States. Internationally, there is "a
most homosexual couples were planning to tell the child [and] 40% of these couples
would like the identity of the donor to be registered." Frith, supra note 227, at 822
(citing A. Brewaeys et al., Children from Anonymous Donors: An Inquiy into Homo-
sexual and Heterosexual Parents Attitudes, 14 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS &
GYNAECOL. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 23 (1993)).
230. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 122 ("Nonetheless, the overwhelm-
ing majority of parents who have used either donor sperm or donor eggs do not
disclose to their children that they were created through donor gametes."); see also
Naomi Cahn, Children's Interests and Information Disclosure: Who Provided the Egg
and Sperm? Or Mommy, Where (and Whom) Do I Come From?, 2 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 1, 16 (2000) [hereinafter Cahn, Children's] ("In a recent study of parents who
conceived children through gamete donation, more than one-half of the parents sur-
veyed did not intend to disclose this information to their children, while slightly
more than one-third expected to do so."); McWhinnie, supra note 228, at 810-11
(describing how strongly many families adhere to such secrecy, even avoiding discus-
sions of the fact of gamete donors among couples).
231. Frith, supra note 227, at 819 (citing guidelines from the American Society for Repro-
ductive Medicine and the American Association of Tissue Banks); see also
McWhinnie, supra note 228, at 807 (noting that the "established medical practice in
assisted reproductive technology [] where donated gametes are used, is to favour ano-
nymity of donors, to stress confidentiality and the privacy of the infertile adults");
ABA MODEL ACT, supra note 146, at § 1002(1)(a) (requiring that "[d]onor and col-
laborative reproduction registries (or equivalent) created for the purpose of
maintaining contact, medical, and psychological information about donors, gesta-
tional carriers, and children born as a result of ART . . . [e]stablish procedures to
allow the disclosure of non-identifying information, while protecting the anonymity
of donors").
232. Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 8 (noting that "donors are often promised ano-
nymity by the sperm bank, clinic, or under state statute"); id. at 9 (observing that
even though "the identity of egg providers was often well-known in early cases, there
is now more anonymity and secrecy attached to this process as well"); Ertman, supra
note 15, at 20-21 (describing California Cryobank's contract, which provides that
recipients of the sperm agree that they "shall not now, or at anytime [sic] require nor
expect [the bank] to obtain or divulge to Client the name of any Donor, nor any
other identifying information contained in the files of [the bank]").
233. Frith, supra note 227, at 818.
234. Id. at 821.
235. McWhinnie, supra note 228, at 814 (noting that it was introduced "because of the
difficulty of attracting oocyte donors" and that it treats the choice as "a matter of
preference rather than of 'moral rightness'").
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discernible trend" towards openness, even with respect to identifying
information about gamete donors.236 In Australia, for example, legisla-
tion was proposed to allow children of artificial insemination by donor
to learn of the identity of the donors when the children are older.237 The
United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria, Western Australia, and the Nether-
238lands have prohibited anonymous donations. Perhaps, we will begin to
see a shift in American attitudes that reflects the movement in other
countries toward greater openness. But until that happens, American
baby markets will tend to favor the interests of donors and intended
parents in restricting access to donor information over the interests of
children in learning about the donors.
Others have debated the virtues of anonymity and secrecy sur-
rounding ART.239 Many of the arguments in favor of anonymity are
consistent with preserving the personhood and relational autonomy in-
terests of buyers and sellers in baby markets. Anonymity can preserve
236. Frith, supra note 227, at 819 (describing the actual or contemplated removal of ano-
nymity of gamete donors in Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand,
and Holland); see abo Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 516 (noting that some
countries "require the disclosure of non-identifying medical or genetic information,
and other jurisdictions ... require the disclosure of donor identity when the child
comes of age"); McWhinnie, supra note 228, at 815 (describing that "a movement
towards much greater openness about origins and antecedents is part of a growing
perception ... in Europe, in Australia and in Canada that donor offspring's rights
and needs have to be given recognition and not denied or ignored"). One poll in
England found that 83% of those surveyed believe that medical and health records of
sperm donors should be disclosed. Call to End Sperm Donor Anonymity, BBC NEWS,
June 26, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/I1/hi/health/2065329.stm. Cf McGee et al.,
supra note 229, at 2034 (noting that the same shift towards openness with respect to
the fact of having been adopted is developing with respect to disclosure to "children
conceived using donor gametes"). Medical practitioners are also gradually becoming
more supportive of general openness in this context and of telling children that they
were brought about through assisted reproductive technologies. Some even advise
parents to tell their children. McWhinnie, supra note 228, at 811; Ethics Committee
of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Informing Offipring of Their
Conception by Gamete Donation, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 527 (2004) (supporting
disclosure from parents about the use of donor gametes in their conception).
237. See, e.g., Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 25; Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4,
at 509, 541 (Ultimately, "the change came not through new legislation ... but
through the adoption of new Ethical Guidelines by the National Health and Medical
Research Council.").
238. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 542; Olga van den Akker, A Review ofFamily
Donor Constructs: Current Research and Future Directions, 12 HUMAN REPROD. UP-
DATE 91, 93 (2006); Kate M. Godman et al., Potential Sperm Donors, Recipients'and
Their Partners' Opinions Toward the Release of Identifing Information in Western Aus-
tralia, 21 HUMAN REPROD. 3022, 3022 (2006).
239. McWhinnie, supra note 228, at 813; CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at
117-29 (discussing the arguments in favor of anonymity).
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the parent's right to privacy with respect to reproduction.240 In addition,
anonymity potentially expands the choices of individuals who want to
create families by maximizing the supply of donors24 1 and possibly en-
242
suring better quality gametes. Many defend anonymity as a way to
protect and enhance the formation of families, which goes directly to
relational concerns. 243 Some suggest it also strengthens the child's bonds
with the "social" parent,244 discouraging donors who want to be overly
involved in the children's life. 245
Of course donors have a stake in anonymity as well. Given that
their choice to sell gametes often reflects a desire to sever connections
with and separate from the future child, gamete donors might value
anonymity to avoid unwanted contact with the future child or the newly
240. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 220 ("A second critical argument
against information disclosure centers on the privacy rights of everyone involved: the
social/legal parents, the gamete providers, and the child."); Cahn, Children's, supra
note 230, at 20-24 ("Some advocates for birth parents and civil libertarians, have
analogized the adoption/gamete provision decision to that made by women choosing
to undergo an abortion, claiming that the right to privacy regarding abortion should
also protect adoption."); Frith, supra note 227, at 822 (noting that for many couples
anonymity helps hide the stigmatizing fact of the underlying infertility); Jennifer A.
Baines, Note, Gamete Donors and Mistaken Identities: The Importance of Genetic
Awareness and Proposals Favoring Donor Identity Disclosure for Children Born From
Gamete Donation in the United States, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 116, 119 (2007) (noting
that anonymity protects parents against being subject to the stigma of infertility).
241. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 545; Frith, supra note 227, at 823 (noting
that in "Sweden there was a drop in both the number of donors and the demand for
AID after the 1984 legislation that removed donor anonymity, although this decline
has been reversed.... A similar trend in declining donor numbers has been noted in
Victoria after the passage of their legislation to remove anonymity."); Robert
Winston, This Foolish Threat to the Gift of Life: As Ministers Plan to End Anonymity
for Sperm Donors Britain's Leading Fertility Expert Issues a Warning, DAILY MAIL
(London), July 26, 1999, at 10.
242. In countries that no longer preserve anonymity, donors tend to be older, which theo-
retically could reduce the quality of the gametes. Frith, supra note 227, at 823.
243. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 217 ("Mandating identity disclosure
may suggest that genetic origins are superior to socially and legally created parenting
relationships and thereby contribute to the danger of over-emphasizing one's biologi-
cal composition."); Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 15 ("'Anonymity is a tool
that protects the social and psychological construct of the family resulting from gam-
ete donation."' (quoting a physician)); Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 516
(noting that "anonymity... protect[s] recipients from demands for visitation or pa-
rental recognition"); Ertman, supra note 15, at 21 (noting that anonymity facilitates
"the formation of family units based on intent, rather than biology alone"); Baines,
supra note 240, at 120.
244. McGee et al., supra note 229, at 2034.
245. Guido Pennings, The Double Track Policy for Donor Anonymity, 12 Hum. REPROD.
2839, 2843 (1997).
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created family.246 Even more, they may want to avoid being responsible
for child support.247
In my earlier discussion concerning the personhood and relational
interests in gametes and embryos, I addressed the self-definin aspects of
reproductive decisions to buyers and sellers in baby markets. However,
I did not discuss issues of human flourishing and self-definition for the
future child. Individuals may decide that they want to separate from
their gametes or genetically-related embryos, but these are not decisions
that affect only them. If we are concerned with one's self-definition in
relation to others, we must think not only of the buyers' and sellers' in-
terests, but also of the interests of children born through ART.249
While some suggest anonymity avoids upsetting children about the
facts of their origins and that their self-esteem should depend on "the
emotional environment created by being a wanted child," not genealogy
and genetic origins, the evidence suggests that donor anonymity
threatens the personhood and relational autonomy interests of the re-
sulting children. It prevents them not only from knowing one or both of
their biological parents,252 it can prevent them from learning important
facts about these biological parents as well as information about their
genetic heritage.253 Children born via ART may be curious about the
246. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 119 (quoting a doctor stating "I
can't think of one that said, 'Boy, I just look forward to meeting my child when they
reach the age of 18,' not one").
247. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 516.
248. See supra Part I.
249. See Alvard, supra note 224, at 43 (" [T]he interests of children conceived by means of
collaborative reproduction should form a significant part of any analysis of the rights
of parents to undertake collaborative reproduction processes").
250. See Frith, supra note 227, at 822 (noting that some actually believe that it is not in
the child's best interest to know his or her origins in this context); McGee et al., supra
note 229, at 2034.
251. McWhinnie, supra note 228, at 813; see Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption,
Reproductive Technologies, and Genetic Information, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 150-51
(1998) (Anonymity is helpful to "prevent a genetically deterministic view of people as
nothing more than a packet of unfolding genes.").
252. Ertman, supra note 15, at 21.
253. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 126 ("Like adoptees, children of
donated gametes may feel a sense of 'genealogical bewilderment,' a feeling that they
are confused about their identity and different from other children."); Cahn,
Children's, supra note 230, at 5 ("While non-disclosure recognizes that one's parents
are the individuals who function as parents, it denies these children may be interested
in other adults who contributed to their creation."); Spar & Harrington, supra note
3, at 66 ("Individuals want to know from whom they came. They may not want to
maintain any kind of emotional relationship with their birth mother, with their
sperm donor, or with the woman who provided the egg from which they sprang, but
they want to know ... that information."); China R. Rosas, Comment, A Necessary
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source of their inherited traits, such as eye and hair color, or certain talents
and predispositions. 254 As genetics becomes more important in medical
diagnosis and treatment, knowledge of one's genetic history will become
ever more important.255 Such information may be a prerequisite to provid-
ing genetic testing for certain late-onset conditions, preventive care, or
prenatal testing once the child reaches reproductive age.25 6 Individuals
conceived in this manner may also have strong desires to discover more
than just medical information about the donor. Understanding their ge-
netic origins or lineage may be important to their self-identity and self
understanding, precisely the kinds of concerns that go to relational auton-
257
omy.
These claims are not merely speculative, as the experiences with
adoption suggest. 258 Adoptees often "feel a need to understand their
'heritage' and to integrate the circumstances surrounding their birth into
Compromise: Recognizing the Rights of a Donated Generation to Tame the Wild Wild
West of California's Sperm Banking Industry, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 393, 416 (2008) (On
Maslow's hierarchy of needs, "a donor offspring's need for identifying biological
information is akin to an 'esteem' need, since donor offspring lacking such
information often experience psychological problems."); Baines, supra note 240, at
118 (citing arguments against anonymity, including: "identifying information is
considered essential to human well-being, both physical and mental" and "people
have the right to know the truth of their origins").
254. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 127 ("Children want to know why they
have a certain eye color, where their musical talent comes from, whose sense of hu-
mor they have, and they want to know their medical histories.").
255. Lorie M. Vandenbusche, Integrating Genetics into Primary Care: Family History is Key,
Torics IN ADVANCE PRACTICE NURSING EJoURNAL, June 18, 2008, http://
www.medscape.com/viewarticle/575481; Rosas, supra note 253, at 416 (On
Maslow's hierarchy of needs, "[a] donor offspring's need for medical information is
akin to a 'safety' need, since donor offspring cannot be secure in their health without
such information.").
256. McGee et al., supra note 229, at 2034-35 (describing the importance of genetic in-
formation for construction of genetic pedigrees for genetic counseling).
257. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 126 ("Nonetheless, several studies
have examined whether donor offspring experience identity problems that are similar
to those of adopted children, and although the studies often conflict, they do indicate
that at least some donor children experience a sense of loss for not having informa-
tion about their biological pasts or being able to establish a relationship with their
gamete providers."); Cahn & Singer, supra note 55, at 173 ("There is substantial, al-
beit controversial, evidence that, for some adult adoptees, access to information about
their biological origins may be central to their construction of identity.").
258. See Cahn, Childrens, supra note 230, at 9 (noting the similar desire to learn about
one's genetic parents in adoptees and children born through gamete donations);
Frith, supra note 227, at 821 (noting that some support these claims by turning to re-
search in the adoption context).
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their overall sense of self. 25 9 For many, information about their biologi-
cal parents is crucial to their identity and self-definition.260 Of course, we
cannot rely entirely on adoption data given notable distinctions between
adoptees and children born of ART. Biological parents of adoptees had
parental rights, which they relinquished; whereas gamete donors simply
provided genetic material.261 Consequently, the ART child may struggle
far less with a sense of abandonment, especially when they are biologi-
cally related to one of their legal parents. 262 This might suggest that
knowledge of one's genetic parents could be less central to the ART
child than the adoptee 263 especially when the fact of adoption can be so
self-defining for an adoptee.264
Even so, evidence suggests that a similar drive for knowledge of
one's genetic heritage can exist in the ART context. Although no
systematic studies have examined these issues in individuals born of
artificial insemination by donor, a few small studies capture the
experiences of roughly 80-90 of such adults.265 All of them, who only
learned late in life about their origins, reported "problems of personal
259. Cahn & Singer, supra note 55, at 173; see also CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra
note 1, at 127 (noting that children "believe that finding the donor will help them to
learn more about who they are"); Id. at 218 ("Knowing the identity of a biological
progenitor may help the child in her identity development, but it is certainly not the
only factor in that development."); Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships, 17 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 190 (2002) (observing that many adoptees want to know their
birth parents "to fill in missing parts of their identity").
260. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 127 ("There is substantial evidence
that, for some gamete children, access to information about their biological origins
may be important to their own construction of identity."); Cahn, Children's, supra
note 230, at 5 ("Adoptees generally seek access to their original birth certificates,
which include the names of their biological mother and perhaps, their biological fa-
ther."); see also Cahn & Singer, supra note 55, at 173 (observing that there is
"substantial, albeit controversial evidence that, for some adult adoptees, access to in-
formation about their biological origins may be central to their construction of
identity"); id. at 175 (identifying medical reasons and self-identity concerns as argu-
ments adoptees have offered in litigation to explain why they sought access to their
birth records); id. at 172 n. 102 (noting that even minor adoptees may "need informa-
tion about their biological origins, especially as they mature").
261. Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 6.
262. See Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 10; Frith, supra note 227, at 821 ("Donor
offspring are in a very different position to adoptive children within the family, they
have not been abandoned by their genetic parents and they are often biologically re-
lated to one member of the couple."). But see McGee et al., supra note 229, at 2035
(arguing that the differences between adoption and this context are not differences
that "are relevant for the disclosure debate").
263. Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 10.
264. Cahn & Singer, supra note 55, at 173.
265. See McWhinnie, supra note 228, at 811.
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identity"26 6 as well as "anger, resentment at the lies and deceit, loss of a
sense of self and of their identity."267 Not only did they wish they had
known sooner about the fact that they were born via donor
insemination, they wanted information about the donor:
what he looked like, what he was like as a person, his educa-
tion and interests and especially details about his health and
family health record. Some want to meet him, at least once. It
is a source of great frustration and anger that this will never be
available to them. For some, the quest for information about
their donor father preoccupies them. . . .A recurring comment
about their anger and frustration is that no one thought them
important enough to keep records about their donor father
and that the system was set up intentionally to deceive them
and to make it impossible for them ever to know.268
Admittedly, there are methodological problems in relying on small
studies of individuals born through artificial insemination by donor.269
Indeed, it is "by no means certain that not knowing ... the identity of
one's donor can cause psychological problems." 270 But we need not show
that anonymity leads to psychological problems to make claims about
the importance of donor information to the child. At a minimum, these
studies suggest that some individuals born via gamete donation will find
this information of great consequence, not just for medical reasons, but
for their sense of identity and self-definition.
Anecdotal reports certainly confirm the suggestions from these
studies. Oprah Winfrey recently interviewed sperm donors and indi-
viduals born through artificial insemination by donor to explore their
266. See Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 10.
267. McWhinnie, supra note 228, at 812 (noting that it did not matter whether they
learned about their origins after family disagreements or divorce, a significant event
(i.e., medical event that required such disclosure), or asking about their origins be-
cause they were puzzled about something in the family relationship.) Similar feelings
of resentment, betrayal, and distrust have been found in adopted children who
learned of their adoption late in life or through third parties. McGee et al., supra note
229, at 2034.
268. McWhinnie, supra note 228, at 812.
269. Selection bias may be present in these studies given that respondents were members
of support groups, who might have had greater problems with these issues than those
who did not participate in such groups. Id.
270. Frith, supra note 227, at 821 (noting also that because "anonymity has been the
dominant model it has been difficult to conduct comprehensive studies on the effects
of disclosure and identification of the donor").
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reactions to the process.27 1 Understandably reactions differed.272 But
some children experienced great sadness and frustration in not being
able to learn who their donor father was. 273 Among the interviewees
were a mother and her donor-conceived son, who had started a Donor
Sibling Registry because of her son's "curiosity . . . about his genetic ori-
gins."274 Frustrated that "no public outlet exists for mutual consent
contact between people born from anonymous sperm donation," they
created the registry to help those who are genetically-related through
sperm donation make contact with one another, including "their own or
their child's half-siblings, their own or their child's sperm or egg donor,
or their own genetic offspring."275 In the piece, Oprah's show profiled
the moving encounter between two half-siblings who found each other
through the registry.276 Finding a heretofore unknown genetically related
half sibling filled a personal gap that each had felt due to being cut off
from half of their genetic identity.277
While there is a danger in believing that our genetic identity is our
complete identity, and while our society may increasingly overstate the
value of genetic information in self-definition,278 we should not reject
the value and interest in genetic identity. It is not merely a social con-
struct that should be discouraged;279 it is a way to connect to one's
"biological past."28 0 An interest in one's biological parents is not always
based solely on a desire for medically relevant information. The desire to
know one's genetic heritage is part of a complex discovery of identity,
understood in relation to the many who shape us: intimates, family, and
271. The Oprah Winfrey Show: The Ultimate Reunion: When Dad is a Sperm Donor (NBC




274. See id.; Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/ (last visited
Mar. 11, 2009).
275. Donor Sibling Registry, supra note 274. The site "has helped connect more
than 6300 half-siblings (and/or donors) with each other. . . ." Id.
276. Oprah Winfrey Show, supra note 271.
277. Id.
278. Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 17 ("Genetic information, while potentially
helpful, does not reveal everything about a person's identity."); Mary L. Shanley, Col-
laboration and Commodification in Assisted Procreation: Refections on an Open Market
and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAw & Soc'y REV. 257, 269
(2002) (rejecting genetics essentialism while advocating an end to donor anonymity);
Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special
Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 674-75 (2001) (describing and chal-
lenging the views that genes are all or nearly all determining).
279. See Shanley, supra note 278, at 268-69.
280. Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 17.
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community.281 "The information provides additional background to [the
children's] full identities-genetic, emotional, and even cultural. 28 2 Our
environment and social relationships are clearly central to self-definition,
but so is our genetic information.283 Both pieces of the nature/nurture
puzzle are important in self-understanding and self-definition, especially if
we understand the self in relational terms.284
As I suggested in Part I, self-identity, understood relationally, de-
pends not only on our intentions with respect to relationships, but on
the existence of relationships that have social, cultural, and intergenera-
281tional importance. just as one's gametes, even when sold, are to some
degree self-defining by virtue of the intergenerational connection be-
tween the gamete donor and the child who will result, 28 6 So too can
knowledge about the gamete or embryo donor be self-defining to the
ART child. The very fact that so many people pursue ART in order to
have a child who is genetically related speaks volumes to the importance
of genetic connections to self-definition. 28 7 "Why . .. not see biological
connectedness to the past as an equally vital part of the identity of chil-
dren?" 28
Unfortunately, a potential conflict arises between the relational
autonomy interests of the parents and donors and the relational auton-
omy interests of the child. As noted in Part I, the relational autonomy
interests of the donor are often less significant than that of the intended
281. See MACINTYRE, supra note 26, at 217, 205-06 ("[T]he story of my life is always
embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am
born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from the past, in the individualist mode,
is to deform my present relationships. . . . What I am, therefore, is in key part what I
inherit, a specific past that is present to some degree in my present."); id at 205 ("I
inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts,
inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my
life . . . . This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity."); Shanley, su-
pra note 278, at 268 ("The right to learn the identity of one's genetic forebear stems
from some people's desire to be able to connect themselves to human history con-
cretely as embodied beings, not only abstractly as rational beings or as members of
large social (national, ethnic, religious) groups.").
282. Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 20.
283. See generally Suter, Disentangling, supra note 20.
284. See supra Part I.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 26-33, 53-60.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
287. See Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 18.
288. James L. Nelson, Cloning, Families, and the Reproduction of Persons, 32 VAL. U. L.
REv. 715, 719 (1998) (quoted in Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 18); see
Shanley, supra note 278, at 267 ("[Ihf the genetic tie had no significance whatsoever,
it would not need to be hidden.").
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parents.289 So too are they less than that of the child. The decision to sell
the gamete is a form of separation, which treats the gamete as a com-
modity, and therefore implicates relational self-definition less fully, even
if the biological connection implicates self-identity to some extent.290 In
contrast, as discussed above, the child's interest in his or her genetic heri-
tage is a significant aspect of relational self-definition, especially since it
includes a subjective desire for connection, not just an objective biologi-
cal connection. 29' As a result, the presumption should lie in favor of
resolving the conflict between the child and donor in favor of the child's
right, at the age of majority, to access identifying information about the
donor.292
Adoption raises similar conflicts of interest between the biological
parents and the adoptee. As Professors Cahn and Singer have noted, in
the context of adoption the competing interests of the various parties are
fluid.29 When the child is born, the identity interests of the birth par-
ents are more salient than those of the adoptee. 294 Thus, Cahn and
Singer argue for respecting the difficult choice of the birth parents as
well as the "broad deference accorded to parental decision-making on
behalf of children" at that point.295 But as the child reaches the age of
maturity, "the child's identity interests outweigh the birth parent's earlier
desire to prevent the establishment of a parent-child relationship." 296
Similarly, as the child born via gamete or embryo donation matures, so
does his or her interest in self-definition and identity begin to predomi-
, . . .297
nate over the gamete donor's interests in anonymity.
There is an added reason to resolve the conflict in favor of the
mature donor child's interests. Eliminating anonymity, at least
provisionally, pushes all of the participants, especially the donors, to
understand their choices not merely as individual acts, implicating solely
their interests and desires, but as acts that have implications beyond
themselves.298 Of course, donors or sellers motivated by altruism
289. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
290. See id.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 248-277.
292. Of course, the child should have the right not to seek out this information if he or
she chooses not to do so.




297. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 232 ("As the child matures, however,
the child's identity should begin to predominate.").
298. Shanley, supra note 278, at 269 ("Law and social practice should foster the under-
standing that what individuals do, even on a small scale, has repercussions beyond
themselves and their intimate associates.").
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consider the effects of their actions on others besides themselves.299 They
may, however, be focusing primarily on the infertility of the buyers, but
not as much on the child that will result.o If we envision autonomy
from a relational as opposed to an individualistic perspective, choices
involving reproduction should consider the implications for the future
children as well. Removing the presumption in favor of anonymity
forces the sellers to view gametes and embryos less as commodities, but
more as part of the creation of someone's future family.301 In short, such
an approach moves us from an individualistic conception of autonomy
to a relational conception, where we understand our actions in terms of
our place in the larger community.
The interests of the intended parents, however, are significant given
their commitment to create a deep and enduring relationship with the
donor child and their need to establish a stable family unit to nurture
that relationship.302 This means that resolving the conflict between their
interests in anonymity of donors and the future child's interest in disclo-
sure is more complicated. The parents' ability to create a family without
interference from others seems as significant as the child's interest in
discovering his or her origins. Yet part of relational autonomy requires
consideration of the impact of choices not only on oneself but also on
those who are central to one's self-definition.o Removing the presump-
tion in favor of anonymity would force intended parents to consider not
only their own interests in having a family, but also their future child's
interests in self-definition. Once parents are able to create the family
they intended, their central relational interests have been largely met. As
I discuss below, however, issues concerning the integrity of the family
299. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
300. See K.K. Ahuja et al., An Assessment of the Motives and Morals of Egg Share Donors:
Policy of 'Payments' to Egg Donors Requires a Fair Review, 13 Hum. REPROD. 2671,
2671 (1998) (finding that donors in the United Kingdom typically share eggs out of
concern for couples who otherwise would not be able to have children).
301. Professor Cahn observes that, unlike in the adoption context where biological moth-
ers have expressed strong desires to know the adoptees, "there has been no
corresponding movement among gamete providers." She hints that this "unsettling"
casualness can commodify the resulting children, whom they may view as "'products'
of their business" transaction. Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 12-13.
302. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 217 ("In the context of adoptees
who are seeking information about their biological parents, critics have charged that
the adoptees are overly concerned with biology, and are seeking to elevate biological
relationships over adoptive relationships."); Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 5-6
("In addition, non-disclosure implies that functional parents would be threatened if
this additional information could be discovered, rather than recognizing the security
and integrity of the functional parent/child bond.").
303. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
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remain, which can be addressed in alternative ways. The child's rela-
tional autonomy interests, on the other hand, are potentially thwarted if
donor anonymity is required.'0
Again, as Cahn and Singer discuss with respect to adoption, the
identity interests of the adoptee become quite powerful as the child
reaches the age of majority.' So too do the interests of the ART child.o6
As a result, in most cases, we should favor the adult child's relational
autonomy interests in obtaining information about the gamete donors
over the intended parents' interests in retaining donor anonymity. Prohib-
iting the disclosure of identifying information "values contract over
connection,"3 07 thus undermining the relational elements of self-definition
for the child. When one considers that the child cannot negotiate in the
market transactions that favor anonymity, the argument becomes even
more powerful.o Once again, we see how an unregulated market exter-
nalizes some of the true costs associated with the buying and selling of
309gametes.
Arguing further in favor of this approach is the value to the com-
munity of giving social recognition to all of the vital participants in the
creation of these ART families.31 o It takes a village to raise a child and
sometimes a village to create one. But anonymity hides that fact. Ano-
nymity provisions, while intended, in part, to benefit the families
created through ART, may do damage to such families. They suggest
that such families are not valid and must be disguised to blend in with
and look like the typical nuclear family."' Anonymity symbolically
erases the contribution of others, suggesting that the only participants
were the intended parents. It isn't surprising that when ART is used with
single people or gay couples, anonymity is less important because in
those cases there is no possibility of blending-such families, by defini-
tion, look different from the traditional nuclear family of one mother
304. See supra text accompanying notes 278-284.
305. Cahn & Singer, supra note 55, at 174.
306. See supra text accompanying note 297.
307. Cahn, Children 's, supra note 230, at 26.
308. The goal here is not to allow the future child's interests to trump the interests of the
parents or donors in all cases, but to bring the child's interests to the table and to cre-
ate a presumption in favor of the child's interests, given the strong relational
autonomy concerns at stake for the child.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 206-208.
310. Shanley, supra note 278, at 269 ("It is good, however, when social practices reflect
the fact that specific human beings are necessary for any person to come into exis-
tence .... ).
311. Cf Cahn, Children ', supra note 230, at 25-26 (suggesting the secrecy surrounding
gamete donation is "emblematic of the attempt to make adoptive, or gamete, families
'look like' other families, to create the family 'as if it had been biologically created").
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and one father.' If we want greater social acceptance of families created
through ART, we should be willing to acknowledge, rather than hide,
them. "The requirement to make a provider's identity available upon the
request of the offspring would constitute social recognition of the fact
that children come into the world through the actions of specific per-
sons, which can now include both 'intentional' parents ... and genetic
providers.
In removing the presumption in favor of anonymity and emphasiz-
ing the interests of the child, however, we need mechanisms to protect
the interests of the intended parents and the donors as well as the integ-
rity of the newly created family. If we allow children to trace their
genetic roots upon the age of majority, we must have clear legal rules
establishing that the intended parents are the legal parents.' Further, to
prevent donors from intruding upon the family, laws must ensure that
the "the donor would have no access rights to the child: they would only
be available if the child chose to contact them."' Similarly, to honor
the rationale for removing the presumption in favor of anonymity, only
the child (upon reaching the age of majority), not the purchasers of the
genetic material, should have the right to know the identity of the do-
316
nor.
312. See Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 15.
313. Shanley, supra note 278, at 268-69. A related argument against anonymity is the
potential role it could play in reducing the risk of "accidental incest," the unknowing
procreation with a half-sibling. See generally Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing
the Line-or the Curtain?-for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 59
(2009) (arguing that incest prohibitions should apply to consanguineous relationships
created by ART and suggesting methods to reduce the risk of accidental incest). Of
course, eliminating anonymity completely is not the only solution to the risk of acci-
dental incest. As Professor Cahn suggests, limiting the number of donations that
sperm or egg donors can make is one solution, as is informing children of their donor
conception or requiring genetic screening before marriage to ensure the couple are
not genetically related. See id. at 99-104.
314. See Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 536-37 (noting that essential to the cli-
ents' trust in Rainbow Flag Health Services, a sperm bank whose philosophy is to
disclose donor identity, is a background state law that "severs the parental status of
the donor when the parties use a physician to perform the insemination"). The 2002
Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA"), for example, establishes that a "donor is not a par-
ent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 702 (2002). Removing anonymity, of course, does not in itself change any existing
rules that prohibit donors from being recognized as legal parents. But a clear state-
ment that donors will not be recognized as legal parents with possible explicit
exceptions might be important to reassure intended parents and donors.
315. Frith, supra note 227, at 823.
316. Shanley, supra note 278, at 268.
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Of course, this approach is not without its risks. Many worry that
it could limit the availability of donors.'17 When June Carbone and
Paige Gottheim first learned of efforts in Australia to eliminate anonym-
ity of donors, they hypothesized that such a policy would "cause
shortages that would either drive artificial insemination underground
into more informal practices or spur fertility tourism abroad."318 Their
research revealed that a shortage of sperm donors in Australia occurred
even before any changes in anonymity provisions were made and was
due to the ban on payment of donors."9 In other countries, however,
prohibiting anonymous donation has been shown to cause a shortage of
donors.3 20 Evidence suggests, however, that these declines need not be
permanent. In Sweden, for example, the drop in number of donors and
demand for artificial insemination by donor was ultimately reversed.32'
A period of readjustment might be necessary as we make the cultural
shift toward greater openness.
A number of approaches are possible in the context of embryo and
gamete donation. One approach is to prohibit anonymity across the
board. While this protects the child's interests in relational self-definition
by guaranteeing her access to information about her biological parents
upon the age of majority, it runs the risk of completely ignoring the
other values and interests at stake.322 A more balanced approach would
be to create a presumption of disclosure. This could happen legislatively,
with laws that require openness unless good cause is shown for protect-
ing anonymity. One commentator has even suggested that sperm banks
"charge clients for health updates and pay more to donors [for] keeping
in touch."3 23 Alternatively, to draw upon the importance of deliberative
decision making discussed in Part III, a full discussion of the value of
openness could be part of the informed consent process.324 Part of the
317. See, e.g., CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 120; id at 227 ("One of the
primary-and strongest-arguments against disclosure of the identity of gamete pro-
viders is that it will have a negative effect on the supply of sperm and eggs."); Cahn,
Children's, supra note 230, at 24; van den Akker, supra note 238, at 93.
318. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 509.
319. Id. at 510.
320. See id at 540 (describing shortages in Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands); God-
man et al., supra note 238, at 3022 (describing shortages in Western Australia).
321. Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 25; Ken Daniels & Othon Lalos, The Swedish
Insemination Act and the Availability of Donors, 7 Hum. REPROD. 1871 (1995); van
den Akker, supra note 238, at 93.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 240-247.
323. See Rosas, supra note 243, at 418 n.216.
324. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 162 (noting that a regulated baby
market "might include informed consent from recipients and providers concerning
mandatory disclosure for children").
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value of avoiding anonymity is to help make the gamete sellers become
aware of the full implication of their decisions-to help them see their
actions, not as the sale of a good, but as assisting in the creation of an-
other human being and a family.3 25 Simply prohibiting anonymity may
not achieve this goal as fully as educating the donors about the interests
of the child in knowing something about her genetic parents. My incli-
nation is to include a combination of these approaches. That is, to
require a presumption in favor of openness, as well as a full discussion of
the reasons for this presumption, when individuals consider whether to
sell gametes or embryos. Such an approach tries to balance the fact that
the child cannot negotiate his or her preferences at this point and em-
phasizes the full relational significance of the act of selling gametes-
pushing the sellers to see their actions, not as business transactions, but
as family building.326
In dealing with the issue of anonymity, we have some limited guid-
ance from the adoption world, where similar debates have been ongoing
about an adopted child's right to access information about her biological
parents.327 Historically, adoption records remained sealed unless the
adoptee demonstrated good cause.328 Often a "compelling medical need"
325. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 162 (stating that market regulation
could "include an improved system for informed consent for all gamete providers
concerning not just the physical risks (which vary for sperm and egg donation), but
also the consequences of providing gametes: the creation of a child"); Shanley, supra
note 278, at 268-69 ("Stipulating that the provider's name can be disclosed at the
request of the grown child precludes imagining the child as the genetic offspring of
'nobody' or of 'anybody,"' rather than of an individual. Abolishing anonymity not
only addresses the identity interests of the person who comes into being as a result of
gamete transfer but also encourages society to think of human agency and responsi-
bility in collaborative procreation.).
326. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 162 (explaining how a discussion of
disclosure impresses on donors the "consequences of providing gametes: the creation of
a child"). Cf supra text accompanying note 313.
327. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 225 ("The analogies between the do-
nor's claim to privacy and those claims asserted in the adoption context are quite
strong."); Cahn, Children's, supra note 230, at 5-8; Cahn & Singer, supra note 55, at
173-75; Paula J. Manning, Baby Needs a New Set ofRules: Using Adoption Doctrine to
Regulate Embryo Donation, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 677, 679 (2004) ("Over the pre-
vious decade, lawmakers, social workers, birth mothers, adoptees, and their advocates,
have worked hard to dismantle adoption laws that originally promoted secrecy and
denied adoptees access to their own birth records."); McGee et al., supra note 229, at
2033-34 ("Traditionally, in the domain of adoption, couples had been advised not to
tell their child of his/her origin. Secrecy was believed to be in the best interest of the
child.... This tendency toward secrecy has shifted, however, and today most adop-
tion agencies advise parents to disclose to the child that they were adopted.").
328. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 225-26 ("In both [adoption and gam-
ete donation], state statutes have typically specified that disclosure is available upon a
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sufficed,3 29 and in a few instances, "the right to identity" sufficed."' To-
day many states grant adoptees access to information about their genetic
origins."' Some states have developed mutual consent registries.332 In a
few states, adoptees no longer must demonstrate good cause and can
access medical and "other non-identifying information," sometimes even
without the consent of the birth parent.333 Finally, in some states,
adoptees may now access all adoption records, including identifying in-
formation.3 3' These laws do not require good cause or consent of the
birth parents.3 In crafting laws to guarantee greater openness of donor
information in baby markets, we can look to the adoption debate both
for reasons for such openness and for ideas as to how to legislate provi-
sions guaranteeing such openness.
V. AcCESS
So far we have seen how unregulated baby markets might create
power imbalances and distort decision making of both sellers and buyers
as well as respond to their preferences for anonymity at the expense of
the future child's interests in relational autonomy. With respect to ac-
cess, markets play a complicated role. As noted earlier, many argue in
favor of unfettered markets as a means to increase access to assisted re-
production.336 Markets might achieve this in two ways. First, markets
showing of 'good cause,' and ultimately, courts have decided that good cause can
sometimes trump these privacy interests."); Manning, supra note 327, at 714-15.
329. Manning, supra note 327, at 714-15.
330. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIEs, supra note 1, at 229 ("A few courts have allowed birth
record disclosure based on an adoptee's severe psychological need to learn about the
identity of her biological parents."); see, e.g., In re Dixon, 323 N.W.2d 546, 552
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646,
655 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). But see In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766
(Mo. 1978) (finding such reasons insufficient for opening sealed records); In re Assa-
lone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1389 (R.I. 1986) (same).
331. Baines, supra note 240, at 121.
332. Id. at 122.
333. Manning, supra note 327, at 715.
334. Id.; Baines, supra note 240, at 123 (noting that some states have completely open
adoption records).
335. Id. at 715-16, 716 n.281.
336. Ertman, supra note 15, at 16 ("Moreover, lack of regulation [of the parenthood mar-
ket] and a relatively low price for the gametes means that it is both an open market in
which a large number of people can participate, and a free market that flourishes be-
cause of its comparative freedom from regulation."); Landes & Posner, supra note 84,
at 339 ("[Tlhe baby shortage ... [is] the result of legal restrictions that prevent the
market in operating freely in the sale of babies, as of other goods."); CAHN, TEST
TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 150-51 ("[M]arketization-the creation of a free
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can increase the supply of reproductive materials by enticing people to
make their gametes or embryos available in exchange for financial com-
pensation.337 In addition, unregulated markets allow individuals to sell
their reproductive materials on terms that they choose."' Thus, for ex-
ample, as Part IV discussed, letting sellers remain anonymous may affect
supply.339 Second, unfettered markets theoretically prevent discrimina-
tory barriers that would otherwise keep certain marginalized individuals
(e.g., single women or gay and lesbian couples) from taking advantage of
this technology.340
In spite of these benefits, as Judith Daar has nicely demonstrated,
evidence suggests that within baby markets, three major barriers prevent
would-be buyers from participating: cost, minority status, and being
single."' As Part V argues, there is reason to question the claims that
markets will overcome these barriers. The first claim that markets in-
crease supply, ultimately goes to questions of cost."' If supply increases,
the cost of reproductive material might be less prohibitive, thereby al-
lowing buyers who could not otherwise afford this technology to take
advantage of it.' Intermixed with issues of financial barriers are issues
of race. As Sections A and B suggest, markets are not likely to over-
come financial and racial barriers alone, even if they lead to a greater
supply of reproductive material.' The second claim about discrimina-
tion is more complicated. As Section C argues, unfettered markets are
economy-facilitates access by marginalized groups, such as single women and gay
and lesbian partners, fosters new family forms through allowing the creation of fami-
lies outside of the heterosexual nuclear and biologically-related family."); see also supra
note 68.
337. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 522 ("The supply of gametes, like any other
commodity, is a function of the available price and the relative demand."); Garrison,
supra note 208, at 1628 ("The U.K. largely outlaws payment to ova donors, with the
result that demand for donated ova exceeds supply."); see Landes & Posner, supra
note 84, at 338 (arguing that one of the causes of the "baby shortage" is that there is
no economic incentive to place children in adoption as opposed to placing them in
foster care); see also supra note 68.
338. See infra text accompanying note 401.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 241-242.
340. See infra text accompanying note 401.
341. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms,
23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUsT. 18, 22 (2008).
342. See infa Part V.A.
343. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 148 ("The sales practices reveal the
blatant, unregulated market that characterizes the ART industry; gamete prices are
the result of supply and demand."); HUBERT D. HENDERSON, SUPPLY AND DEMAND
18 (2d ed. 1922) ("[Wjhen supply exceeds demand the price tends to fall."); see also
infra text accompanying notes 348-351.
344. See infra Part V.B.
345. See infa text accompanying notes 353-360, 370-380.
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not possible if legislatures are determined to discriminate. In short, we
cannot rely on markets to overcome discriminatory impulses.
These three problems of access raise, however, different kinds of is-
sues-whether people should have equal access to gametes, embryos,
and ART, and whether people should be entitled to them. Markets inevi-
tably ration goods, and they rarely do so equally."' When markets lead
to unequal access because they reflect discriminatory impulses that is
particularly problematic."' But whether there is an obligation to over-
come every obstacle to reproduction is another question, raising
different problems about access. Since each barrier-cost, minority
status and marital status-raises different kinds of structural problems
and solutions, I address each in turn.
A. Cost
Cost is the most obvious barrier given that a single cycle of IVF, for
example, generally costs upwards of $10,000.4' The fact that most health
insurance plans fail to cover such treatment is a major barrier to many.
This problem raises empirical questions about the effects of markets on
supply and price. Does legitimizing or promoting baby markets increase
supply5 o and thereby reduce prices so that more individuals can partici-
pate in these markets?"' My sense is that a free market probably cannot
346. Cf CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 134-44 (discussing "cultural infer-
tility," the "inability to become pregnant because of cost or discrimination or social
attitudes").
347. See CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 141 (discussing disproportionate
access to ART along racial and cultural lines); id. at 150 (noting that opponents "ar-
gue that the sale of eggs and sperm results in a series of quantifiable harms, ranging
from exploiting the gamete providers to encouraging eugenics, as consumers choose
the 'best possible' genes, to leading down the slippery slope that ends in buying chil-
dren, to discrimination based on class because of who is able to buy gametes");
Ertman, supra note 15, at 31-32 (discussing access concerns associated with an ART
market).
348. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 8; RicHARD E. JONES & KRUSTIN H.
LoPEz, HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 450 (3d ed. 2006) (The cost of one IVF cy-
cle alone in 2002 was $12,400.).
349. Daar, supra note 341, at 22; CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 136 ("Even
for workers with health insurance, infertility services will probably not be covered.").
350. Michele Goodwin is persuasive as to how the supply of organs could be increased
with legitimate markets, which might benefit the very people many worry are harmed
by markets. See Goodwin, supra note 68 passim.
351. Cf id.; Mahoney, supra note 73, at 214-15 ("[P]ayments to those who have the right
to agree to donate . .. organs could cause an increase in the supply of transplantable
organs available," which "could in turn decrease the costs of transplant procedures,
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fully address cost and therefore cannot overcome these financial barriers.
Indeed, as I suggested above, a feature of free markets is usually unequal
participation in the market."'
Although evidence suggests that free markets may increase the sup-
ply of reproductive materials,5 complicated mechanisms are at work in
baby markets that still limit access. First, in spite of the increased supply
of reproductive material, prices for some ova have actually gone up as
niche markets emerge in response to consumer demand for reproductive
material from sellers with certain traits. Moreover, medical costs asso-
ciated with bringing about pregnancy' will not decrease simply because
more reproductive material is available. These costs alone make infertil-
ity treatment prohibitively expensive for many and cannot drop to
affordable levels for those facing economic hardships simply because
more ova and sperm are available. Without some sort of mechanism to
assist those who are priced out, access will remain an issue even with
unfettered baby markets.
Judith Daar offers a nice discussion of the possible solutions to and
complexities of these financial barriers, which unfortunately are not lim-
ited to ART; they pervade the delivery of healthcare generally in this
country.35 She observes that simply mandating health-insurance cover-
age of infertility treatment, as some states have done, may "have little or
no overall effect on the use of [fertility] treatments in the United
States. 35 7 This is not entirely surprising given that health insurance is
resulting both in more operations and in increased accessibility of medical care for the
less affluent.").
352. See supra text accompanying note 346.
353. Kerry Howley, Ova for Sale, REASON, Oct. 2006, at 18 (describing how prohibitions
or caps on compensation "dry up" "donations," as illustrated by the two to eight year
waiting lists in Britain, which imposes caps, and the "reproductive tourism" of indi-
viduals seeking to avoid the strictures of Britain, Australia, and Canada); see also
Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 523.
354. See Stock, supra note 68, at 27 (noting that the supply of ova is not low, just the
supply of high priced ova, which are valued accordingly); infra Part VI.
355. The cost of one IVF cycle alone in 2002 was $12,400. Jones & Lopez, supra note
348, at 450. Given that most couples will repeat the procedure an average of four
times and that the chance of having a live birth with any cycle is twenty-eight per-
cent, the average expenditure for IVF per live birth is about $60,000. Id.
356. Daar, supra note 341, at 36-38; see also CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at
141 (discussing the disproportionate access to general healthcare coverage experienced
by American minority groups).
357. Daar, supra note 341, at 37, 40 (noting, for example, that "disparities in access to
infertility treatment continue to exist along racial and ethnic lines" in Massachusetts,
which has a "comprehensive mandate to provide infertility services"); see also JESSICA
ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECH-
NOLOGIES AND THE LAw 8-11 (2007), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/
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tied to employment.358 The uninsured are of course not affected by such
mandates. Because they generally represent a lower socioeconomic group
than the insured, the uninsured are far less likely to have the resources to
pay out-of-pocket for such treatments.5 9 Ultimately, "socioeconomic
status and to a lesser extent employment status, significantly affect one's
ability to access ART services in the United States."06 o
One solution to these financial barriers is universal access to health
insurance that covers ART treatment. Political resistance to universal
healthcare aside,' however, deciding to provide healthcare to all does
12/pdf/arons-art.pdf (describing the various state policies regarding insurance cover-
age and infertility treatment).
358. See Matthew Kanter, Healthy Start: A Policy and Legal Analysis of Health Care Reform
in Massachusetts, 2 McGILL J. L. & HEALTH 65, 72 (2008) ("[O]ne of the biggest
problems in the American health insurance market today [is that] people drift in and
out of insurance coverage as their employment status changes . . . .").
359. Daar, supra note 341, at 37 ("Because insurance mandates only affect individuals who
have access to private health insurance, this group is generally wealthier and more
likely to be employed than the general population. These are often the same indi-
viduals who can access ART with their own resources; thus the marginal benefit from
insurance coverage tends not to increase usage among the insured.").
360. Id. at 38 (noting that "one part of the solution to unequal access to infertility treat-
ment may rest in improving coverage by employer-sponsored insurance among those
most likely to need ART services").
361. While our nation has periodically flirted with universal access to health insurance, the
cultural and political resistance to universal insurance has always prevailed. Morning
Edition: Health Care Back in the National Spotlight (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 19,
2007) (noting that the flirtation occurs with the frequency of the arrival of the cica-
das), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=8941004
(follow "listen now" hyperlink). A recent survey, however, indicates that "Americans
across party lines [would be] willing to make some sacrifice to ensure that every
American has access to health insurance." Robin Toner & Janet Elder, Most Support
U.S. Guarantee ofHealth Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2007, at Al. A recent New York
Times/CBS News poll found that a majority of Americans say that the federal gov-
ernment should "provide national health insurance." CBS News / New York Times
Poll, American Public Opinion: Today vs. 30 Years Ago (Feb. 1, 2009), http://
www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/SunMo-poll-0209.pdf. Barack Obama's victory in
the presidential campaign is consistent with these beliefs given that a significant part
of his platform was a promise to reform healthcare and make "health insurance
affordable and accessible to all." Obama Biden Health Care, http://
www.barackobama.comlissues/healthcare/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2009); see alo Senator
Barack Obama, The Time Has Come for Universal Health Care, Address before the
Families USA Conference (Jan. 25, 2007) ("In the 2008 campaign, affordable, uni-
versal health care for every single American must not be a question of whether, it
must be a question of how. We . . . will have universal health care in this country by
the end of the next president's first term."); President-elect Barack Obama, Remarks
at a Health Care Briefing Press Conference in Chicago (Dec. 11, 2008) ("The time
has come this year in this new administration to modernize our health care system for
the 21st century, to reduce costs for families and businesses, and to finally provide af-
fordable, accessible health care for every single American.") (transcript available at
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not answer the difficult question of whether we should treat ART like
other kinds of healthcare, i.e., whether we are morally obligated as a so-
ciety to overcome the obstacles of infertility in the same way we are
obligated to treat illnesses like cancer and diabetes. Not everyone who
believes that all Americans should have access to health insurance be-
lieves that insurance should cover such treatment; many view infertility
treatment as discretionary.3 62 Of course, others disagree. For instance,
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine defines infertility as a
"disease of the reproductive system" and "NOT an inconvenience.",63 In
addition, the consensus among courts is that infertility is a medical ill-
364
ness.
Recent findings about the corollary public health issues associated
with the expensive costs of infertility treatment may influence this de-
bate. While some are completely priced out of the expensive ART
market, others are almost squeezed out. Having scraped together enough
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/us/politics/1ltext-obama.html). As Congress
battles over the details of healthcare reform, however, some of the public's
enthusiasm for such reform seems to be waning a bit. Adam Nagourney & Megan
Thee-Brenan, New Poll Finds Growing Unease on Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
2009, at Al (noting that 69 percent of people polled feared "the quality of their own
care would decline" if everyone received healthcare coverage, although 66 percent
feared the loss of their own insurance without healthcare reform).
362. Daar, supra note 341, at 26.
363. American Society of Reproductive Medicine: Frequently Asked Questions About Infer-
tility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (defining
infertility as "a disease of the reproductive system that impairs the body's ability to
perform the basic function of reproduction"); See also Kristen P. Wright & Julia V.
Johnson, Infertility, in DANFORTH'S OBSTETRICS & GYNECOL. 705, 705 (Ronald S.
Gibbs et al. eds., 10th ed. 2008); Spar & Harrington, supra note 3, at 68 (arguing
that we should treat "infertility as a medical condition and incorporat[e] it into our
health care system"). But cf Am. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS,
GUIDELINES FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE 330, 330 (William H.P. Herbert et al., 2d
ed. 2002) ("There is a great emphasis in modern society to have only the number of
children desired at the time in a woman's reproductive life that is most convenient.
Thus many couples seek fertility services to overcome acquired diseases, enhance the
naturally decreasing fertility associated with age, and accommodate their lifestyle
agendas."). Infertility might fall within the American with Disabilities Act because, as
the Supreme Court found in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998), repro-
duction is a major life activity. Of course this does not mean that an insurance plan
must cover infertility treatment. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 340-
41 (finding no ADA violation in failing to cover infertility treatments if the insurer
denied such benefits to both fertile and infertile people); see Jessica L. Hawkins, Note,
Separating Fact from Fiction: Mandated Insurance Coverage of Infertility Treatments, 23
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 203, 208 (2007).
364. See Daar, supra note 341, at 29-30 (discussing the concept of infertility as a medical
illness); id. at 44 (stating "the consensus among courts that infertility is a 'medical ill-
ness').
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money to afford a single IVF cycle, they are likely to choose to implant
multiple embryos to increase the chances of bringing a child to term. 365
Unfortunately, this also increases the risk of multiple births and all of
the attendant health consequences to babies likely to be born prema-
turely.366 A recent study found that "patients prefer to transfer one
embryo when freed from financial pressures to transfer multiple em-
bryos, which can occur when patients have limited or no insurance to
pay for treatment.",67 Thus government funding or insurance coverage
of IVF, in reducing the need to implant more than one embryo, would
reduce the public health risk and enormous costs of multiple births.
The debate as to whether infertility treatment should be included
in health-insurance coverage highlights the differences between financial
barriers to access and discriminatory barriers. The former problems raise
questions as to how we understand infertility treatment and the very
difficult and inevitable rationing questions posed by attempting to pro-
vide healthcare to all. In other words, are we morally obligated as a
society to make sure that everyone is entitled to infertility treatment, or
is our obligation merely to ensure that no one is prevented access for
discriminatory reasons? Inequity is always problematic, but inequity
based on price differentials and inequity based on discrimination present
different moral problems and concerns. I turn now to the latter, more
serious, inequity: discriminatory barriers based on minority status.
B. Minority Status
As Professor Roberts has shown, minority status is another
well-known barrier to accessing reproductive technologies. 6 1 Assisted re-
productive technologies are "accessible largely to white, middle- to upper-
class infertile couples" because it is a "private, fee-for-service" treatment.3 70
This is both because of significant disparities in health-insurance
365. Stuart Laidlaw, Fund IVF, Experts Urge Government, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 11, 2009,
at LI.
366. Id.
367. New Study Proves Multiple Births From IVF Can Be Avoided, P.R. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 3,
2009 http://www.newscom.com/cgi-bin/prnh/20090203/DC66439LOGO.
368. Id; Laidlaw, supra note 365, at Li.
369. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
935 (1996); CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 141-42.
370. Marcia C. Inhorn & Michael Hassan Fakih, Arab Americans, African Americans, and
Infertility: Barriers to Reproduction and Medical Care, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 844,
844 (2006); CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 141.
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coverage between minorities and non-minoritiessn and overall socioeco-
nomic differences between these groups.372 The relative lack of access to
treatments of infertility among minorities is exacerbated by the fact that
minority women are proportionately more likely to be infertile than
white women. 7' Distrust among some minorities of the healthcare
profession generally, and with respect to reproductive technologies
specifically, may make them "far less likely to seek treatment" than
374
non-minorities. Much of this distrust may stem from a history of
discrimination against minority groups within the healthcare system. 7
It may also be heightened by fears that some physicians believe minori-
ties shouldn't be having any more children.7 Shame may also keep
377some minority women away from attempting to access such services.
In part, the solution lies with efforts to address economic disparity
along racial lines, but it also requires efforts to address underlying dis-
crimination by healthcare providers, which may help overcome
suspicion towards the medical community by some minority groups.378
Unfortunately, civil rights litigation has not been effective in addressing
problems of inequity in healthcare generally." "As plaintiffs have often
371. Daar, supra note 341, at 39-40 (noting that thirty-three percent of Hispanics, twenty
percent of blacks, but only eleven percent of whites, lack health insurance); CAHN,
TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 141-42 ("Since higher educational levels and
greater financial means are more common among white women than among His-
panic and black women, seeking infertility services has also been more common
among whites.").
372. Daar, supra note 341, at 41.
373. Id. at 22.
374. Id. at 39-40 (noting that a study found that "Arab and African Americans ... regard
the U.S. health system with a degree of suspicion and distrust, based on past experi-
ences of racism and discrimination").
375. See, e.g., Paul A. Lombardo & Gregory M. Door, Eugenics, Medical Education, and
the Public Health Service: Another Perspective on the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, 80
BULL. HIsT. MED. 291 (2006).
376. Daar, supra note 341, at 41.
377. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 259 (1997) (describing one black woman's shame in her infer-
tility: "Being African-American, I felt that we're fruitful people and it was shameful
to have this problem").
378. INST. OF MED. & NAT'L AcADs. OF Scis., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 172-75 (2003) (discussing physi-
cian prejudices and bias and the resulting patient mistrust as being a source of
healthcare disparities among minority populations); Daar, supra note 341, at 42.
379. See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern
Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath
of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 215, 220, 229
(2003) (Although "the legislative history of Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act] indi-
cates that health care was prominent in the minds of its authors, . . . [p]laintiffs in the
few Title VI health care cases that have been litigated over the years have tended not
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failed to prevail in cases dealing with the provision of basic medical ser-
vices . . . pursuing a case against a provider for refusing to provide what
is often viewed as discretionary services seems impossible.""'o We might
better direct our efforts toward influencing the attitudes of healthcare
providers and addressing the minority communities' deep distrust. One
approach would be to increase sensitivity and awareness between the
infertility industry and minorities by increasing interactions between
these groups."' Training of medical professionals could focus on some
service to minority communities.382 Minority populations and the popu-
lation at large would also be served by education regarding infertility, its
treatments and causes."' As Nanette Elster has suggested, "the infertility
industry [could] become more patient-friendly to racial and ethnic mi-
norities by, for example, lobbying to increase insurance coverage for
ART services, locating fertility clinics in more diverse neighborhoods,
and increasing public awareness in minority communities about infertil-
ity and its treatment. 384
C Marital Status
Finally, marital status can influence one's access to infertility ser-
vices because of discrimination by providers or legislators who are
uncomfortable with unmarried individuals using ART. One survey
showed that roughly twenty percent of providers refuse to provide such
services to unmarried women."' A recent case, North Coast Wonen's Care
Medical Group v. Superior Court,38 6 illustrates these views. The plaintiff,
to fare well."); Brietta R. Clark, Hospital Flightfrom Minority Communities: How Our
Existing Civil Rights Framework Fosters Racial Inequality in Healthcare, 9 DEPAUL J.
HEALT CARE L. 1023, 1026 (2005) ("Despite [its] promise, Title VI [of the Civil
Rights Act] has not prevented the massive hospital closures and removal of critical
services from minority communities.").
380. Daar, supra note 341, at 42 (noting that "attempts to address racial discrimination in
health care via traditional civil rights litigation under existing statutory schemes have
proved frustrating for private individuals, who often must show intentional discrimi-




384. Daar, supra note 341, at 42 (discussing idea from Nanette R. Elster, ART for the
Masses? Racial and Ethnic Inequality in Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 9 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 719, 731-33 (2005)).
385. See Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefi ofAssisted Reproductive
Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 65 (2005).
386. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review granted, 139 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2006),
superseded by 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
2009] 285
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Guadalupe Benitez, was a lesbian woman who had tried with her part-
ner to conceive with self-insemination.387 After no success for fifteen
years, she sought medical services for intrauterine insemination, which
the North Coast doctors refused to provide, claiming it went against
their religious beliefs.388 Although the California Supreme Court ulti-
mately ruled that the physician's acts violated "California's Unruh Civil
Rights Act ... prohibition against discrimination based on a person's
. . 389 -- - -* * - - *
sexual orientation, not all states have similar antidiscrimination stat-
utes to protect against such discriminatory impulses among healthcare
providers, 390 which unfortunately are "not unusual.""' Moreover, it is
not clear whether even in California, Benitez would have been protected
against discrimination if she were denied treatment because she was sin-
392gle, as opposed to being a lesbian.
387. N Coast Women's Care Med. Group, 189 P.3d at 963 n. 1 (summarizing the holdings
of the trial and appellate courts, which said that a healthcare provider could discrimi-
nate based on marital status).
388. N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, 189 P.3d at 963 n.1. A question of fact was
raised as to whether the religious objection was based on the plaintiffs sexual orienta-
tion or her marital status. The appellate court ruled that at the time of the suit, no
law prohibited discrimination based on marital status. As a result, the trial court was
instructed to determine the basis of the religious objection. Id.
389. N. Coast Women's Care Med Group 189 P.3d at 962. The court rejected the argu-
ments of the physicians that "the rights of religious freedom and free speech, as
guaranteed in both the federal and the California Constitutions, exempt a medical
clinic's physicians from complying with" the antidiscrimination provisions. Id.
390. Susan B. Apel, Access Denied Assisted Reproductive Technology Services and the Resur-
rection ofHill-Burton, 35 Wm. MITCHELL L. REv. 412, 416 (2009) ("Some state laws
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation exist,
but they are spotty in the sense that many states have no such legislation and those
that do vary in the kinds of discrimination they prohibit and to which kinds of enti-
ties they apply"); Susan B. Apel, Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 12 MICH.
ST. U. J. MED. & L. 33, 38-39 (2008) [hereinafter Apel, Access to ARTJ ("At least ten
states have [civil rights laws] that include both marital status and sexual orientation.
Whether the state prohibitions apply to fertility clinics is a troublesome issue. State
legislation tends to follow the federal law in prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment and in public accommodations. The law as to whether fertility clinics constitute
public accommodations is subject to dispute.") Although the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
"frown[] upon discrimination against same-sex individuals and single people," they
"uphold the ability of providers to make decisions about access based upon the pro-
viders' judgments regarding the welfare of the potential child." Apel, supra at 416-17.
Moreover, these positions "are advisory in nature" and there are no corresponding
"effective enforcement mechanisms." Id. at 417.
391. Id. at 412 (2009) ("Surveys of fertility clinics in the United States show that this kind
of discrimination is not unusual").
392. Id. at 417. See note 388 (observing that there was a question of fact as to the basis of
the discrimination).
286 [Vol. 16:217
GIVING IN TO BABY MARKETS
Another barrier to obtaining infertility services is created by legisla-
tures that try to prevent unmarried individuals from accessing these
technologies.'9 Texas, Florida, Nevada, and New Hampshire, for exam-
ple, appear to allow only married couples to enter into legally
enforceable gestational surrogacy contracts.39 Legislators in a few states
have tried explicitly to prohibit healthcare providers from offering medi-
393. Such statutes raise equal protection concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. As Professor Radhika Rao has argued, such statutes
would be unconstitutional because they would "treat the very same act-the use of a
particular technology-differently based upon the marital status or sexual preference
of the persons involved, with no real basis for the distinction other than societal dis-
approval or prejudice." Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology
and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1475-76 (2008) This, she
argues, would be no different than a law regulating the distribution of contraception
of unmarried individuals, which was found unconstitutional in Eisenstadt v. Baird.
Id. at 1475. I have argued, however, that we cannot presume that the constitutional
protections that apply to decisions concerning contraception and abortion necessarily
apply to decisions to use ART technologies like IVF. Suter, Repugnance, supra
note224, at 1520-64. If the interest in using ART is not considered a fundamental
constitutional interest, than the state need only find a rational basis for prohibiting
the access of these technologies to some individuals. As Rao notes, the state prohibi-
tion of "the use of ARTs is permissible as long as it is based upon a legitimate interest
that goes beyond mere prejudice. The government could limit the use of ARTs in or-
der to prevent physical, psychological, or social harms to the participants or the
resulting children." Rao, supra, at 1479. State concerns about the welfare of children
raised in a single-family household would likely be such a legitimate interest that is
not based on prejudice.
394. See Daar, supra note 341, at 46 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b) (West
2006); FLA. STA. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West 2006)); see also NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 126.045 (LexisNexis 2004) (restricting surrogacy agreements to people "whose
marriage is valid" under Nevada law and defining "intended parents" as "a man and a
woman, married to each other"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 (West 2002) (ap-
pearing to allow only married couples to enter into surrogacy contracts since
"'[i]ntended parents,' including an 'intended father' and 'intended mother,' means
people who are married to each other, and who . . . enter into a surrogacy contract
with a surrogate by which they are to become the parents of the resulting child"). In a
related vein, the Arkansas electorate recently voted in favor of an initiative that pro-
hibits people cohabiting outside of a valid marriage from adopting a child or
becoming a foster parent of someone less than eighteen years of age. Ark. Proposed
Initiative Act 1 (Unmarried Couple Adoption Ban) (2008). Similarly, many state
laws regarding donor insemination only discuss married couples. Human Rights
Campaign, Donor Insemination, http://www.hrc.org/issues/parenting/donor
insemination/donor inseminationlaws.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) (describing
such statutes from Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and
Tennessee). Some state laws, however, expressly or implicitly appear to allow unmar-
ried women to undergo artificial insemination. See id. (describing statutes from
Arkansas, California, Colorado, D.C., Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Texas, and Wisconsin).
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cal services to assist unmarried women in conceiving or procreating.
These efforts have not yet succeeded, which has prompted some legisla-
tors to try to achieve these goals through less overtly discriminatory
language. In 2006, State Senator Marshall of Virginia, introduced "a
watered-down"396 bill that would prohibit the use of "anonymous dona-
tions of gametes" and require that "the identity of any unrelated oocyte
or sperm donor . .. be noted in the health record of any woman pa-
tient" seeking assisted conception. While this might seem consistent
with my argument that anonymity threatens children's relational auton-
omy interests in knowing their genetic heritage, this law is clearly
motivated by something different. It allows the intended mother to have
this information, rather than just allowing the child to access such in-
formation upon the age of majority, a very different kind of proposal
indeed. By tapping into the debate regarding anonymity of donors,
Senator Marshall seems determined to do indirectly (and in a less overtly
polarizing way) what he was not able to achieve with explicitly discrimi-
natory legislation.' His bill has not been enacted so far. 00
Some have suggested that free markets can help overcome some of
these non-financial barriers. As Martha Ertman points out, unfettered
market in gametes and embryos can help individuals, who might other-
wise be discriminated against by the Senator Marshalls of the world, to
395. Daar, supra note 341, at 43; Mary Beth Schneider, Assisted Reproduction Bill Dropped,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 6, 2005, at 2B (describing a bill introduced in late 2005 by
an Indiana State Senator that would have required couples seeking medical assistance
in reproduction to be married to one another, but which was ultimately dropped be-
cause the Senator found the "issue has become more complex than anticipated"). A
Virginia House Bill introduced in early 2006, which stated, "No individual licensed
by a health regulatory board shall assist or perform any intervening medical technol-
ogy ... for or on an unmarried woman that completely or partially replaces sexual
intercourse as the means of conception." Daar, supra note 341, at 43. It was ulti-
mately dropped two weeks later. Id.
396. A. Barton Hinkle, Editorial, Marshall Mans the Barricades Against Child-Hating Les-
bians, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), Dec. 12, 2006, at A13.
397. H.B. 412, 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006) (introduced Jan. 11, 2006, con-
tinued to 2007). See also H.B. 2123, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007) (a bill
that would amend a statute relating to disclosure or risks associated with infertility
treatment, and which would not allow anonymous donations).
398. See supra Part IV.
399. Cf Daar, supra note 341, at 46 (describing such attempted legislation as appearing
"facially neutral in terms of the marital status of the woman patient" but as poten-
tially having "the most dramatic impact on single and lesbian women").
400. H.B. 2123, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007), was passed by indefinitely by
the House Committee on Health, Welfare and Institutions, while H.B. 412, 2006
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006), was continued to 2007, with no action to date.
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make self-defining reproductive choices."" Truly free markets, with no
discriminatory or other forms of government intervention, would allow
marginalized groups to negotiate their own fertility arrangements. The
problem is that history suggests that we are unlikely to witness such a
broad scope of freedom of contract across the country.02 Intellectual
consistency might require supporters of free markets to oppose any lim-
its on people's ability to enter into contracts, even unmarried individuals
seeking infertility treatment. But of course, consistency is not a require-
ment for being a legislator. Many who theoretically support free markets
may be the very ones who object to single people's accessing these mar-
kets.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that a completely unregulated pri-
vate market will offer the types of choices that Ertman advocates.40 The
private market will likely reflect majoritarian preferences, choosing to
exclude certain groups from accessing ART in the same discriminatory
fashion as the physicians in North Coast Women's Care Medical Group.404
Undoubtedly, some niche markets will arise to provide ART for other-
wise marginalized groups,40' and surely this is better than an outright
prohibition of their use of ART. Nevertheless, niche markets do not of-
fer the full access that could theoretically be available if the law restricted
the kind of discrimination that undergirds these exclusions.
401. Ertman, supra note 15, at 35 (arguing that the baby market opens the option of par-
enthood to "previously excluded individuals[,]" such as same sex couples).
402. Cf Apel, Access to ART, supra note 390, at 44 (2008) ("In the United States, it is
difficult to predict whether state and/or federal legislation in this area would be per-
missive or restrictive.").
403. See Ertman, supra note 15, at 41.
404. See Daar, supra note 341, at 43 (Under the current free market approach to ART,
"single women and same-sex couples face reduced access from ... provider discrimi-
nation against single and lesbian women . . . . Documented cases of provider
discrimination against single women and lesbian couples are few, but recent research
suggests that such conduct is widespread."); see also Apel, Access to ART, supra note
390 at 41 ("In the absence of law, decisions regarding access to ART are made by fer-
tility clinics and health care professionals. In the only published survey of ART clinics
on this issue . . . 79% of the responding clinics treated single women and 74% les-
bian couples.").
405. See Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 535-37 (describing Rainbow Flag Ser-
vices).
406. There is, however, some question as to whether antidiscrimination statutes would actu-
ally achieve full access. "Despite the governmental crackdown, discriminatory practices
continue." See MPs Challenge Fertility Clinic Ban on Lesbians, GuARDRkN, July 3, 2006,
at 7, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/jul/03/politics.gayrights. A simi-
lar problem has arisen in Canada, where fertility clinics are specifically disabled from
refusing treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. See Lesbian Couples Say Hospital
Denied Them In Vitro Fertilization, CBC NEws, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.cbc.cal
canadalmontreal/story/2005/01/13/mon-lesbian-050113.html.
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Discrimination based on sexuality or marital status is in and of it-
self inherently problematic. But arguably discrimination in the delivery
of ART services on this basis is also consequentially problematic. Such
discrimination may create public health risks because "single women
and same-sex couples that are otherwise excluded from access to infertil-
ity services often use other means to get access, leading to public health
risks to both the woman and the child to be born." 4'0 Thus, if we are
concerned about marginalization based on sexuality or marital status, we
should find mechanisms under the law to prohibit discrimination in the
delivery of ART based on marital status or sexual orientation.
Professor Susan Apel suggests that the Hill-Burton Act,40 s which
was enacted, in part, to make sure that healthcare services are provided
to everyone within the territorial area of healthcare facilities that receive
federal funds, 40' can be interpreted to prohibit discrimination to ART
based on "marital status, sexual orientation, or other non-medical rea-
sons." 410 Apel does note that the biggest obstacles to such a claim are
state and federal conscience clauses, allowing providers to refuse to per-
form procedures like abortion or sterilization based on moral or
religious objections."' Nevertheless, she aptly points out that there is a
significant distinction between a provider's refusal to perform a particu-
lar procedure on moral grounds and a provider's refusal to perform a
particular procedure "depending on the identity or characteristics of an
individual patient." 412 At this point, however, it remains to be seen
whether courts will interpret the Act as she suggests, particularly since
there has been very little litigation focusing on these provisions of the
413
statute.
Given the uncertainties as to how courts will interpret the Hill-
Burton Act, legislatures should expressly prohibit discrimination in the
407. Crystal Liu, Restricting Access to Infertility Services: What is a Justified Limitation on
Reproductive Freedom, 10 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH 291, 321(2009).
408. Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
5§ 291-291m); Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2268 (1975) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. %5 300q-300t).
409. Apel, supra note 390, at 418.
410. Id. at 4 23.
411. Id. at 428-30 (noting that while some of these clauses focus on procedures that might
seem to be the antithesis of ART, "there is a synchronicity of cultural values that
might make bedfellows of those who oppose abortion and those who oppose ART, at
least for some patients" and that some of these conscience clauses are "not restricted
to abortion and sterilization, but to all kinds of medical procedures").
412. Id. at 430; see also id. at 431 (noting that conscience clauses, "like all legally protected
rights, . . . must balance the patient's need with the provider's rights to act in accor-
dance with moral convictions").
413. Id. at 419.
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delivery of ART based on marital status or sexual orientation. To give
teeth to such prohibitions, legislatures should make clear that antidis-
crimination provisions with respect to the delivery of medical services
include the treatment of infertility.414 A more difficult political problem
is how to deal with legislatures that express discriminatory views in their
efforts to limit access to infertility services to married or heterosexual
couples. Trying to persuade the Senator Marshalls of the world not to
introduce discriminatory legislation, let alone to pass legislation aimed
at preventing the very discrimination they seek, is a serious challenge,
which goes to the heart of the political battles surrounding marriage,
reproduction, and sexuality.41 But simply relying on unfettered markets
to achieve the antidiscrimination goals will be ineffective in the face of
such discriminatory views.
As I have suggested throughout this piece, the consequential harms
of baby markets are too great and varied to leave these markets unre-
stricted. Deciding whether we should allow reproductive material to be
bought and sold does not answer whether markets should be unfettered.
The fact that we have baby markets and still encounter such discrimina-
tion is further reason not to depend on markets alone to solve these
problems. We should instead focus on the kinds of transactions that will
be allowed to occur and whether they are subject to the discriminatory
barriers described above.
414. Daar, supra note 341, at 30-31 (noting that even though courts view infertility as an
illness, it doesn't follow that they consider its treatment to be a medical service); id. at
31 n. 4 0 (describing cases that disagree as to whether infertility should be treated as an
illness for purposes of litigation concerning health-insurance coverage); see supra text
accompanying notes 362-364 (noting that this is a contentious issue; courts vary in
their views as to whether infertility treatment constitutes medical treatment for pur-
poses of litigation concerning health insurance).
415. Some of these political battles were lost recently by the groups opposing discrimination.
In Arizona, California, and Florida, voters passed propositions that only recognize
marriage between one man and one woman. See Ariz. Proposition 102 (2008), http://
www.azsos.gov/election/2008/InfolPubPamphlet/english/ProplO2.pdf (last visited Feb.
14, 2009); Cal. Proposition 8 (2008), http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/ text-proposed-
laws/text-of-proposed-laws.pdf#prop8 (last visited Feb. 14, 2009); Fla. Marriage Prot.
Amend. 2 (2008), http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/fulltext/pdfl41550-1.pdf (last
visited Feb. 14, 2009); see also Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at Al (noting that the above propositions
were passed); but see Marie Szaniszlo, 5th Anniversary for Gay Weds, BOSTON HERALD,
May 17, 2009, at 10 ("Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, and Vermont have all legalized gay
marriage this spring .... ); Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Legalizes Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 4, 2009, at A19 (noting that New Hampshire is the sixth
state to legalize gay marriage). As Professor Apel notes, the infertility medical services
are unique in that they result in a child, and therefore they raise issues about lifestyle
and the welfare of the child. Apel, supra note 391, at 414.
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VI. EUGENICS
Finally, another potential danger of baby markets is the eugenics-
like effect of market preferences. As Gregory Stock has noted, there
really is no shortage of gametes.' Instead, there is only a shortage of
gametes from sellers with particular characteristics. " Ova from white
Ivy League students, with model-like proportions, for example, can
command prices as high as $50,000 or even $100,000,"' whereas a typi-
cal ovum goes for $3,000-5,000.' And sperm from donors with
advanced degrees may sell for more than other sperm.420 Recently the
first made-to-order embryo bank was created, allowing couples to have
421
embryos designed according to their particular preferences. In short,
the market prices reproductive material according to consumer predilec-
tions. Not surprisingly, these preferences reflect the traits that the
privileged in our culture deem socially desirable and advantageous.422 To
many, this is, quite simply, a form of eugenics.423
416. Stock, supra note 68, at 27.
417. Id. (arguing that "there is no shortage of donors in general, just a shortage of donors
with certain profiles of intelligence, beauty, education, religion, and other factors").
418. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 148 (describing the price of a "desir-
able" egg being more than $50,000); Carbone & Gortheim, supra note 4, at 515
(describing prices as high as $50,000); Couple Seeks Eggs for $100,000, supra note 4,
at A16 (describing prices as high as $100,000); Steinbock, supra note 35, at 259 (de-
scribing an ad to pay an egg donor $80,000 if the donor had preferred traits: "height
approximately 5'6", Caucasian, S.A.T. score around 1250 or high A.C.T., college
student or graduate under 30, no genetic medical issues").
419. SPAR, supra note 4, at 45.
420. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note I at 148 (A "vial of sperm . . . can cost be-
tween $200 and $600, although sperm from donors with advanced degree ... may
cost more.").
421. Martin, supra note 12, at 7 (describing an embryo bank's new service allowing cou-
ples to purchase a made-to-order embryo based on particular traits and qualities).
422. Kari L. Karsjens, Boutique Egg Donations: A New Form of Racism and Patriarchy, 5
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 57, 78 (2002) ("[T]he entire premise of boutique egg
donation is to perpetuate certain characteristics that are deemed salient by a select
few. Wealthy couples, who utilize egg brokers or high profile advertisements, do not
seek general traits. These couples are seeking a 'perfect gene pool' for their commod-
ity-notice the highly sought after donor is a woman who has blonde hair, blue eyes,
received a 1400 on her SAT, attends an Ivy League school, and who preferably has
some additional talents such as music, sports, or theatre.").
423. Karsjens, supra note 422, at 87 ("[Tlruly, it is now arguable that medical technologies
are on the slippery slope to eugenics or racial brokering."); Jeffery T. Wise, Embryo
Banking as a Novel Option for the Infertile? Law, Policy, and a Proposed Model Act, 8
Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y, 163, 184 (2007) ("The primary arguments against em-
bryo banking are that the practice leads to a commodification of human life and that
it constitutes another step in the direction of eugenics.").
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Such a characterization of baby markets is loaded and dismisses all
such choices as bad. Because I recently explored what it means to de-
scribe advanced reproductive technologies as eu enic, and whether all
eugenic choices are per se morally problematic,4 2 I only briefly address
the eugenics concern here. One view is that these market choices are an
expression of individual procreative autonomy and therefore are quite
different from the eugenics of the early twentieth century, when policy
makers tried to influence "the fit" to reproduce and discourage "the un-
fit" from reproducing (often through laws mandating involuntary
421
sterilization). Under this view, these market preferences are simply an
expression of reproductive choice made free of government interference,
which is consistent with a liberal conception of autonomy.426
I have argued, however, that if we analyze attempts to control re-
production under a relational conception of autonomy, the moral
propriety of such choices depends heavily on context, motivations, and
intentions.427 Evaluating consumer choices in baby markets under the
lens of relational autonomy suggests that some features of classic eugen-
ics may sometimes be present, even if people decide to purchase
particular reproductive material without state coercion.428 For example, a
particularly troubling aspect of classic eugenics was the underlying ra-
cism and social prejudice that inspired it.429 Some of the market
preferences today reveal, and may even enhance, similar underlying
prejudices and discriminatory views.3 0 Of course, they may also be
424. See generally Suter, Brave New World, supra note 16.
425. Id. at 905-15 (describing the history of eugenics legislation and court action in the
United States); id. at 937-38 ("Today, selecting against undesirable births is an indi-
vidual decision. In the classic eugenics era, such selection was often a decision made
by the state or by physicians at prisons and institutions for the 'feebleminded.'").
426. Id. at 949 ("It seems difficult to criticize, on its face, the underlying goal of eugen-
ics-improving birth--especially when expressed through individual decision
making, without state interference.... Because neoeugenics involves fundamental
decisions about parenting, including whether to retain the capacity to become a par-
ent or whether actually to become a parent, some aspects of it arguably fall within a
fundamental liberty or privacy interest.").
427. Id. at 954 ("[T]he lens of relational autonomy focuses on intent and motivation and
reveals problems with neoeugenics that are more subtle and contextual than state in-
terference with reproductive and medical decision making.").
428. Id. at 955 ("By promoting technologies to avoid the birth of children with genetic
conditions or unwanted traits, we define the 'unfit' (though perhaps we don't use
precisely that expression) in terms of that disability or trait. This fact alone may de-
value the lives of those with the trait.").
429. Id. at 912 (stating that what was wrong with eugenics was the "underlying racism and
class biases, reinforcement of social inequities, and threats against democracy.").
430. Id. at 956 ("[I1f certain traits-e.g., short stature, gender, certain body-types, etc.-
can be selected against and are widely disfavored, individual choices, in the aggregate,
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based on parents' desires to have children that look like them, which
does not in itself reflect any views about race or the value of particular
traits. Often, the motivations may be mixed and not fully clear."' Nev-
ertheless, even if the motivations themselves are not all discriminatory,
the social effects of consumers valuing the reproductive material of some
groups over those of others is disquieting. At best, it reflects the fact that
the most privileged have greatest access to ART.43 2 At worst, it highlights
the devaluation of certain groups in our culture.433
Another concern regarding these market preferences is that they are
part and parcel of contemporary efforts to control, or commodify, the
process of reproduction, a criticism that can be leveled at the eugenics
movement. In other words, some of these consumers are trying to
"produce" babies, rather than accept reproduction as a gift. 3 Of course,
even if we assumed that all parents who pay top dollar for certain ova
viewed reproduction as baby production (a questionable assumption),
this does not also preclude them from accepting the resulting child as a
gift, rather than (solely) as a commodity. Nevertheless, we should be
may lead to fewer people with those traits. The resulting lack of diversity . . . . may
contribute to a lack of tolerance for diversity and enhance existing prejudices against
individuals with the particular trait.").
431. Cf id. at 947 ("Just as classic eugenics was not motivated solely by social well-being,
current and future reproductive technologies are advocated not solely to allow indi-
viduals to make decisions compatible with their values and goals. The technologies
are also promoted and encouraged as socially responsible.").
432. Id. at 959 ("Those with the greatest advantages in society (and often with the traits
most widely favored) will often have greater resources and therefore greater access to
technologies that allow them to select against certain traits or disease or to enhance
certain traits."); see also Daar, supra note 341, at 38 ("[I]t appears that socioeconomic
status, and to a lesser extent employment status, significantly affect one's ability to
access ART services in the United States. For wealthy individuals who can afford to
pay directly for these services, access, for the most part, appears to be wide open.").
433. Suter, Brave New World, supra note 16, at 955 ("By promoting technologies to avoid
the birth of children with genetic conditions or unwanted traits, we define the 'unfit'
(though perhaps we don't use precisely that expression) in terms of that disability or
trait. This fact alone may devalue the lives of those with the trait.").
434. See id. at 912-13 ("A few religious leaders, especially those of the Catholic Church,
objected that eugenics threatened human dignity by commodifying and restricting
reproduction."); id. at 969 ("[W]hen examined through the lens of relational auton-
omy, [neoeugenics] remains problematic when applied in ways that reflect underlying
discriminatory attitudes, exacerbate inequities, or commodify individuals or repro-
duction.").
435. Id. at 960-61 ("The essence of this claim is that commodification intrinsically harms
our human spirit by altering our relationship with procreation and our children be-
cause it transforms reproduction into a process akin to manufacture.").
436. Id. at 961 ("Simply because parents try to control the outcome of reproduction,
rather than to allow things to happen 'naturally,' does not preclude them from view-
ing their children as a gift."); see also CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at
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concerned about moving in a direction that may push some parents to
see their child more as object than as other. More troublesome, I believe,
is the possibility of distorting the parent-child relationship if those par-
ents demand that their children fulfill the expectations that led them to
seek particular traits, or if they see their children solely in terms of the
sought-after traits rather than in their fullness as human beings.3
Again, not all parents will have such reactions." The process of picking
and choosing and trying to control the outcome of one's future child,
however, may increase the possibility of such reactions among some.
Perhaps the greatest and most likely danger is that niche markets,
like classic eugenics, will exacerbate social inequities. Because the price
of reproductive material reflects market preferences, gametes or embryos
believed to possess the most advantageous genetic material will be the
priciest.' "When people know that the genetic material that made a
particular child's existence possible was bought for a higher (or lower)
price than that of some other child, such knowledge may undermine the
proposition that all persons are of equal dignity regardless of their
wealth or social status."o In addition, given that lower socioeconomic
groups already face barriers to ART, the market will effectively price out
all but the most socially advantaged from accessing the most highly
sought-after reproductive material.4  In baby markets, advantage may
literally beget advantage.
In any one instance, a buyer's market preferences might not be
problematic per se, but given existing inequities and racial and social
prejudices, we should be troubled by the tendency to move in this
direction. The problem is that we cannot condemn every choice to seek
out ova or sperm from a particular kind of seller without knowing more
about the reasons that one makes such a choice. Some such choices may
be grounded in precisely the prejudice that made classic eugenics
146 ("Putting a price on something does not necessarily destroy its intrinsic value or
indicate that it is measured only by its economic price.").
437. Suter, Brave New World, supra note 16, at 963.
438. Id.
439. See supra text accompanying note 418-419. Genetics essentialism underlies these
market preferences. The presumption is that the intelligence, good looks, social
status, and any other desirable traits of the seller are largely, if not exclusively, genetic.
Certainly genes can play a strong role in influencing traits, but their role is stronger
with respect to some traits than others. Because of the complexity of genetics and en-
vironmental influences, there is no guarantee that a child conceived with these
gametes will necessarily possess the desired traits.
440. Shanley, supra note 278, at 272; Steinbock, supra note 35, at 260 (noting that John
Arras "has jokingly suggested that perhaps U.S. News and World Report should in-
clude how much their coeds can get for their eggs in their rankings of colleges").
441. See supra text accompanying note 352-354.
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problematic and therefore morally troubling.4 2 But some such choices
may be grounded in efforts to give one's child the best chance in life
based on the reality that certain traits offer certain advantages in a
society where all is not equal.44 ' This kind of choice is less morally
problematic, but highlights and exacerbates the problems of a world of
inequity.
Of course, preferences grounded in discrimination and prejudice
will exist whether or not we buy and sell gametes. They are reflected in
non-market decisions of all types, including whom to befriend, and of
course whom to marry or have a child with. Figuring out how to ad-
dress these preferences, which may reflect better or worse intentions, in
a world that values reproductive autonomy is a very difficult problem,
well beyond the scope of this Article. My goal here is not to solve that
problem, but to address the consequential harm of markets, which exac-
erbate the lurking problems of prejudice and social inequity.
One solution to this problem is to set price limits on reproductive
material.4 ' This would not address the underlying desires that drive up
442. Cf Suter, Brave New World, supra note 16, at 969 ("Neoeugenics as a practice should
trouble us if the underlying intent is not focused on the best interests of the child or
family, but instead is built on discriminatory attitudes, concerns about prestige, or
narrow conceptions of the full value of the future child.").
443. See id. at 935.
But when major life opportunities depend so strongly on abilities (admis-
sion to good schools being the prime example), it is hard to imagine that
many parents wouldn't feel subtle, or perhaps not so subtle, pressures to
seek such advantages for their children. In fact, public opinion polls sug-
gest that there may be substantial demand for genetic enhancement. Forty
to forty-five percent of the American public polled in 1986 and 1992 ap-
proved of gene therapy to enhance physical and intellectual traits.
Id.
444. Ertman, supra note 15, at 30 ("But if we condemn would-be mothers for selecting
donors who, they believe, will transmit what they deem to be socially optimal genes
to their children, then we could ask the same question of both men and women who
select their partners on similar grounds. If we scrutinize white single mothers' selec-
tion of white sperm donors, we should also critique white men who choose to marry
white women or Harvard graduates who prefer to marry others who attended elite
colleges."); Suter, Brave New World, supra note 16, at 957 ("Of course many deci-
sions we make as a society or individually influence who will come into existence and
who will not. Decisions such as whom to marry, when or whether to procreate, as
well as decisions about health policy and social services, for example, all influence
who will be born and who will not.").
445. This approach is recommended by the ASRM, which states that "[t]otal payments to
donors in excess of $5,000 require justification and sums above $10,000 are not ap-
propriate." Ethics Comm. for the Am. Soc'y for Reproductive Med., Financial
Compensation of Qocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 305 (2007). Likewise,
Professor Naomi Cahn argues for a uniform fee schedule for the purchase of gametes:
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such prices, but would minimize the exacerbating effects of such mar-
kets.4  Of course, to the extent that access is already deeply problematic
for many, regardless of whether they seek out the most highly priced
gametes or embryos,447 it is not clear how much this would achieve.
Nevertheless, it would perhaps minimize some of the coercive influence
of markets discussed in Part III. $50,000 might be much more coercive
than $3,000, for example, in enticing women to sell their ova. Allowing
the sale of eggs with caps on payment would reduce those consequential
effects while still offering the financial compensation necessary to main-
448tain an appropriate supply of eggs.
Nevertheless, I am somewhat ambivalent about this approach. For
one, it starts to move us in the direction of eliminating the commodifi-
cation of reproductive material. I have suggested many forms of
regulation in baby markets as a compromise to address my uneasiness
with baby markets. Part of my reluctant acceptance is the recognition
that black markets may emerge if we try to prohibit them. While black
markets are a threat any time we try to regulate baby markets, they seem
most likely to emerge in response to efforts to limit commodification
since pricing is so intrinsically linked to markets.49 In the end, however,
there are normative reasons to express our concerns about prices that go
too high: such prices exacerbate social inequities and devalue certain
groups."o Allowing the market to proclaim so vividly who is valued and
who is not, in a country that has a history of abuse in this respect and
that still struggles with social inequities, is a serious problem. Thus, a
law setting price limits can express the moral obligation to recognize the
One option would set a uniform fee schedule to apply to all sales of eggs,
sperm, and embryos, providing a standard rate for providers and recipients.
This model has the benefit of ensuring that Ivy League credentials, race,
height, and other personal qualifications are financially irrelevant; it helps
insurance companies set a fee structure; and, depending on the price, it
may make these gametes more affordable.
CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 162. This approach is not unheard of.
California has taken this approach in relation to eggs bought for research purposes.
See Sarah B. Angel, The Value of the Human Egg: An Analysis of Risk and Reward in
Stem Cell Research, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JusT. 183, 184-86 (2007) (discuss-
ing the Senate Bill 1260, limiting compensation for research egg donation). Senate
Bill 1260 "strictly limits financial remuneration to reimbursement of direct expenses
resulting from the procedure; the law bans any form of compensation above this
amount." Id. at 184.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 439-441.
447. See supra Part V.
448. See supra text accompanying note 337.
449. See Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 4, at 519 ("A partial ban, such as a ban on
payment, may similarly produce black markets that evade state control.").
450. See supra text accompanying notes 439-442.
2009] 297
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
equality of individuals and the unwillingness to accept the kind of social
stratification that made eugenics so problematic. It is my final example
of choosing the better, when we cannot have the best-of allowing mar-
kets, while actively trying to respond to their consequential threats.
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, my many recommendations are a tall order. Moreover,
they are contrary to the ART industry's interest in avoiding regulation and
difficult to implement in a culture that wants to preserve free markets.
Too much is at stake, however, to leave it all to the market when the
health and well-being of many are at risk. Asking the state to intervene
here is not a radical proposal. Regulation of healthcare is a well-
established police power of the state and baby markets fit well within that
framework. 1 Where commodification raises problems of coercion, dis-
torted decision-making, power imbalances, threats to the relational
autonomy interests of the children, barriers to access, and the threat of
some of the harms of eugenics, we cannot hope or expect market forces
to address these problems. Indeed, evidence suggests that the market has
not adequately addressed the consequential harms in baby markets. In
giving in to baby markets, I am only willing to accept their intrinsic
harms if we can try to address the consequential harms that exist because
of, and exacerbate, the inequities of our culture. We live in a nonideal
world. My pragmatic approach accepts a nonideal solution that never-
theless tries to bring us closer to our ideals. We shouldn't prohibit baby
markets, but we must regulate them. t
451. See supra text accompanying note 223.
298 [Vol. 16:217
